



The Politics of Counter-Terrorism in Nigeria

Bimbo OGUNBANJO, PhD*

Department of Government

Lagos State University, School of Basic and Advanced Studies, Lagos, Nigeria

Abstract

Like other countries confronted with socio-political, economic and security concerns, Nigeria has implemented strategies in response to its economic, political, ethnic and religious crises. The ethnic and religious plurality of the Nigerian state has, to a great extent, influenced the occurrence of political violence in the country. The homogeneity of the state has also engendered complexity in its response to the resulting conflict and violence. This paper examines the Nigerian state, focusing on the various counterterrorism strategies adopted by the Nigerian government and the implications of such strategies for the state, society, and economy. The various counterterrorism strategies exist on the pedestal of the National Counter-Terrorism Strategy and Acts of the National Assembly, called NACTEST. This paper interrogates government performance in the implementation of NACTEST, identifies its achievements, and exposes the limitations of legislative and other policy frameworks in dismantling Boko Haram's terrorism and ensuring peace and security in the crisis zones. This paper exposes the skewed fiscal relations under the defective federalism and how decisions on Boko Haram are driven by primordial, political, ethnic, and religious considerations.

Keywords: Nigerian State, Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism, Federalism, Boko Haram, Acts

Received: 08/01/2026
 Accepted: 26/02/2026
 Published: 28/02/2026

*Corresponding Author:

Bimbo OGUNBANJO, PhD

Email: mbimboogunbanjo@yahoo.com

Introduction

Ad-hoc methods have historically been used by the Nigerian government to end violent conflict. The nation lacked a political structure or counterinsurgency plan. Due to the nation's involvement in establishing and maintaining peace in other insurgency-ridden African nations, this looks inconsistent. Examples are Sierra Leone and

Liberia. To maintain peace in the two nations, Nigeria headed the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). In addition, Nigeria participated actively in UN peacekeeping operations. Umar (2013) noted that rather than addressing the causes of terrorism, the government has chosen to focus on its symptoms. Section 11 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution, which states that the National

Assembly will create legislation for public safety and the public order of the federation, served as the foundation for the initial government reaction to terrorist actions (Pate 2015). Instead of creating security measures to combat the terrorism of Boko Haram, the government has relied on constitutional protections against criminality, violent protest, and dissent.

To address the underlying causes of terrorism and provide efficient responses, sound tactics are needed. The government's response is set out in strategic documents and pieces of legislation (these are the Terrorism (Prevention) Act (TPA) 2011, Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act (MLPA) 2011, Money Laundering (Prohibition) (Amendment) Act (MLPA) 2012, and the Terrorism (Prevention) (Amendment) Act (TPA) 2013), with the National Counter-Terrorism Strategy and Acts of the National Assembly (NACTEST), being the most comprehensive (Dasuki 2018). While it is the anchor in evaluating Nigeria's counter-terrorism strategies, we also take conclusions from the TPA (2011, 2013) and MLPA (2011, 2012) as all of them are interwoven and difficult to study individually.

The Nigerian state has faced many forms of terrorism and ethno-religious militancy in recent decades. A reconsideration of the government's approach to violent conflict was necessary in light of the rise of Boko Haram, its terrorist tendencies, and how it differs from previous violent groups. The underdevelopment of this area is one of the main sources of discontent and armed uprising in

the eastern section of the North. The persistence of violence committed by numerous armed groups is due to the state's failure to provide enough infrastructure and services. The neglect of the Niger Delta's oil community, which has led to armed insurrection and militancy, is a prominent example. Furthermore, misaligned federal arrangements account for sub-national units' low financial standing and bad government performance. The Nigerian state is examined in this paper, with particular attention paid to the numerous counterterrorism strategies used by the Nigerian government and the implications these strategies had on the nation's state, society, and economy. The National Counter-Terrorism Strategy and Acts of the National Assembly, or NACTEST, serve as the foundation for the numerous counterterrorism plans. The effectiveness of the government's execution of NACTEST is examined in this paper, along with its successes and shortcomings as a tool for destroying Boko Haram's terrorism and establishing stability and security in conflict areas. This paper also investigates how armed groups have taken advantage of Nigeria's state fragility to force it to participate in the development of their regions. It does so by drawing on theories of frustration-aggression and state fragility. Returning to federalism and shifting the state's economy away from oil will promote long-term peace and the security of the nation.

The Nigerian State

Several civilizations with their own customs and traditional forms of government operated

independently within the area now known as Nigeria before British colonization in 1861 (Dasuki 2018). These societies engaged in a variety of interactions throughout history, from trade to war. The Hausa, Igbo, Yoruba, Ijaw, Uhrobo, Tiv, Bini, and Nupes lived in these sovereign states. The Yoruba are located in the west, the Igbo are located in the east, and the Hausa/Fulani are located in the north, hence they are actually three significant tribes. The British combined the region lying above the Niger and Benue Rivers to become the Northern Protectorate in 1900, while the region in the southern section became the Southern Protectorate in 1906.

In 1914, when Britain combined these two protectorates, Nigeria as we know it today was born. This process entailed the violent blending of several nations with various historical origins, cultural traditions, and religious beliefs. The inhabitants of the various zones were neither consulted nor included in the integration process. According to Umar (2013: 56), "Nigeria has always been an artificially manufactured state and the outcome of colonial power enforcement in Africa." The British prioritized administrative efficiency and economic considerations over historical, ethnic, and religious diversity (Pate 2015). The cost of colonial programs was decreased by the union of the two protectorates. It was planned that the southern region, which is abundant in natural resources, would "sponsor" the construction of the northern region's infrastructure. While the northern region of Nigeria was renowned for its agricultural

Knowledgeable Research (KR) 2026, vol,5, Issue,02

production, neglect of agriculture was caused by the southern region's pursuit of natural resources. Umar pointed out that, "to amalgamate such ethnicities in a marriage of inconvenience was to forecast a failed relationship, a relationship which no doubt has been characterized to this day by mutual mistrust, hostility, deep antipathy, violence, sectionalism, and ethnic chauvinism" (Umar 2013: 58).

Despite the rhetoric of "unity in diversity," more than a century after the union, the Nigerian state is still grappling with the unfavorable effects of the blending of several nations and distinctive quirks. Nigeria is a country in West Africa. Its northern border is with the Niger Republic, its eastern border with Chad, its western border with the Benin Republic, and its southern border is with the Gulf of Guinea. According to Pate (2015), the nation has a land area of 923,768 km², and its population was predicted to be 182.2 million in 2015. (Pate 2015). Nigeria, which includes more than 250 ethnic groupings and 500 different languages and dialects, is not just the most populated country of African descent in the world (Dasuki 2018). According to Dasuki (2013), there were more than 3000 ethnic groups in the world in the 1960s, 1000 of which lived in Africa, with Nigeria making up a fifth of that continent. There are around 127 ethnic groups in the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), compared to more than 40 in China and India, less than 50 in the USA (excluding American Indians), four in England, seven in France, and about 15 in Germany. Umar (2013) thus notes that Nigeria's degree of plurality is more complex than

others.

Additionally, Nigeria is home to more than 100 distinct religious communities, most of which fall under the categories of traditional beliefs, Islam, and Christianity. Muslims made up around 50% of the population in 2020, Christians made up about 40%, and African traditionalists made up about 10% (Mohammed 2021). About two-thirds of the population is comprised of the Hausa-Fulani, Igbo, and Yoruba ethnic groups (Eneanya 2019). Adele (2021) points out that diversity in terms of ethnicity and religion is a sign of plurality.

Despite Nigeria's diversity, a federal system of government was adopted in 1954 due to the need to promote national unity (Akinbi 2015). Any meaningful attempts to restructure the governance system were put on hold, though, by the fight for independence. Ethnic and religious distinctions were "suspended" by the nationalist leaders who fought for independence in order to achieve political freedom. It was possible to negotiate the end of British rule in Nigeria with a moderately united front. As a result, Nigeria had three independent regional organizations when Britain handed it independence on October 1st, 1960 (the North, West and East Regions). There were formed strong regional governments that were dominated by the dominant ethnic group (the Hausa-Fulani and a majority of Muslims in the north; Igbo and a majority of Christians in the east; and a majority of Yoruba with a nearly equal number of Christians and Muslims in the west) (Fapohunda 2017). In

order to lessen the power of the three major ethnic groups, the Mid-West region—which is primarily home to Binis as well as other minority groups—was established in 1963 (Brinkel & Ait-Hida 2012).

In an effort to lessen minorities' dominance and further the interests of military elites, the military's intrusion into politics in 1966 caused the country to become even more polarized. Due to this, the four existing divisions were divided into 12 states in 1967, which rose to 19 states in 1976, 21 states in 1987, 30 states in 1991, and 36 states in 1996 (Akinola & Tella 2013; Dietrich 2015). 774 local administrations were established in an effort to accommodate pluralism. As a result, some formerly marginalized groups have gained control over some regions, while "emerging" minority are now protesting marginalization. Six geopolitical zones were suggested by the 1995 Constitutional Conference in order to accommodate states according to their ethnic makeup (Akinola & Tella 2013: 17). Pate (2015: 2) lists these as: North-East: Taraba, Borno, Bauchi, Adamawa, Gombe, and Yobe; North-Central: Kogi, Niger, Benue, Kwara, Plateau, Nasarawa and the Federal Capital Territory; North-West: Kaduna, Kebbi, Zamfara, Sokoto, Kano, Jigawa and Katsina; South-East: Ebonyi, Enugu, Imo, Abia and Anambra; South-South: Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Edo, Cross-River, Rivers and Delta; and South-West: Ekiti, Oyo, Ogun, Lagos, Ondo and Osun. The 1999 Constitution does not, however, include a provision recognizing the six geo-political zones in the nation. Boko Haram's stronghold is in the north-east

(within the northern area), and this region is where their reign of terror is most noticeable.

The regional identities that emerged during the First Republic (1960–66) are still observable, notwithstanding the introduction of regional zones. Uneven development in the various regions was one of this era's characteristics. The rate of regional development slowed the expansion of the economy. The nation was renowned for its great agricultural productivity, although this was only found in a few areas that specialized in particular crops. For instance, the Eastern Region produced a lot of palm oil, while the Western Region focused on cocoa plantations. The Northern Region was proud of its groundnut and onion production. Significant disparities in socio-religious values were also present. For instance, in Northern Nigeria, where Islamic education predominated, the Western educational system had minimal impact, in contrast to the south, where Western systems had a far greater impact (Fafunwa 1974; Paden 2019). Grace emphasized the distinctions in Nigeria's ethnic and religious makeup, pointing out that although the Hausa-Fulani and other groups in the north are primarily Muslim and the South-South minority areas and Igbo-speaking regions in the south are primarily Christian. While there is a mix of Christians and Muslims in the Middle Belt (or North-Central Zone), the Yoruba-speaking communities in the South West are made up of roughly equal parts Muslims and Christians. The North-South divide, which is caused by the North's predominately Muslim population and the South's

Knowledgeable Research (KR) 2026, vol,5, Issue,02

predominately Christian population, is caused by this difference, which also accentuates racial divisions in the nation, particularly in the North (Grace 2014: 7).

This demonstrates how ethnic and religious divisions exist in Nigeria. But there are many religious differences, particularly in Northern Nigeria, where the bulk of Muslim communities distinguish themselves from the non-Muslim minority (Akinola & Tella 2013). Thus, Nigeria is not only the nation with the greatest ethnic diversity in the world, but it also exhibits a rich religious culture (Azumah 2015). Due to its proximity to the Atlantic Ocean, the southern region of the country was the first stop for European travelers. They spread Islam southward and Christianity northward, with the center belt representing the meeting point of these two religions (Ilegbinosa & Jumbo 2015). Although there are Muslims and Christians in the Yoruba-dominated South, Islam is more prevalent in the Northern Region, which explains why Boko Haram has significant ties to the religion.

The Evolution and Development of NACTEST and the Acts

An executive order issued by the president on April 30, 2014, created the NACTEST. The NACTEST document, which coordinates all the counterterrorism agencies, contains the government's counterterrorism policies (Dasuki 2018). NACTEST execution is under the direct control of the Counter-Terrorism Center, which is housed in the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) to the President (Eneanya 2019).

The Senate (Upper Chamber) and the House of Representatives make up Nigeria's National Assembly, which serves as the country's federal parliament. The National Assembly is a bicameral organization that is modeled after the US Congress (Lower Chamber). It reviews bills, enacts them into law, ratifies international agreements, okays foreign loans, and carries out supervision duties (Fashagba 2009: 439). The TPA of 2011 was Nigeria's first anti-terrorism law to be passed (Onuoha 2014: 175). Through collaborations between the relevant ministries and their departments, security organizations, and key stakeholders, it seeks to combat terrorism (Campbell 2014; Eneanya 2019: 237). The executive, members of the legislature, as well as private people and groups, may introduce bills in Nigeria. A Bill's conversion into an Act is highlighted on the Assembly's official website.

The executive branch, the legislature, or an individual citizen may propose the bill into the house during the First Reading stage. This could be done in an effort to enact a new legislation, change an existing one, or gradually phase it out. Due to the shortcomings of the prior Act, the MLPA of 2011 was replaced with the MLPA of 2012 (GIABA 2014b: 1). The Speaker sends the Bill to the Rules and Business Committee after receiving it, and the President of the Senate sends it to the Rules and Procedure Committee. These Committees assess the Bill's compliance with presentation and draft standards. If not, it is sent to the National Assembly's Legal Department for better drafting

and more guidance. The Committee(s) then submits the Bill for gazetting and further processing. When a bill is scheduled for first reading, the clerk of the house or senate reads its title, then hands it to the speaker of the House of Representatives or the president of the senate, depending on the situation.

Debate occurs during the bill's Second Reading in front of the entire house. Typically, each speaker is given between five and seven minutes. The motion to read the bill a second time is made by the Senate or House leader and is seconded to start the debate. Members indicate that they will comment on the Bill. It moves on to the committee stage if it wins a majority vote. If not, it might be shelved or reintroduced as a new Bill to restart the process. For instance, on December 14, 2015, the North East Development Commission Establishment Bill passed its second reading (Adele 2021). With money from the federation account and foreign donors, the North East Development Commission was tasked with resettling insurgent victims, repairing and rebuilding roads, the homes of these victims, and other related tasks (Adele 2021).

The committee overseeing the bill conducts a thorough analysis of it at the Committee Stage. Usually, additional committees like the Appropriation Committee—which is now referred to as a Subcommittee—may be asked for their views. When discussing delicate subjects like counterterrorism, such viewpoints are essential. For instance, the military, army, navy, air force, and maybe intelligence committees can offer insightful

comments on counterterrorism that will help the committee members make a wise choice. The Committee then sends the House and/or Senate its report.

A motion to hold the third reading immediately or at a later time under the Third Reading procedure may be made after the House or Senate has discussed the Committee's report in order to circulate certified copies to each house or allow modifications. Following the required adjustments, the House/Senate moves on to the third reading and passes the Bill.

A clean printed copy of a Bill with all modifications is created once it has passed the third reading and been approved. It is then signed by the Clerk and approved by the Speaker or Senate President. The copy is subsequently delivered to the Clerk of the House or Senate, as appropriate, together with a document requiring the concurrence (passage of the Bill or agreement) of the House or Senate. Any of the following three events may occur when a bill is sent to either chamber for approval: the receiving chamber may agree with its provisions and pass the bill, (ii) the chamber may disagree with some provisions and propose revisions, or (iii) the chamber may not agree with the bill at all and reject it in its entirety. However, this situation has never occurred in Nigeria.

When there are discrepancies between the Bills passed by the two Houses, a Joint Conference Committee is constituted. To discuss such

discrepancies, an equal number of the affected committee members from each House will be called to a meeting. A report is then delivered to the two Houses once they have been resolved. In the event that neither Committee is able to reach a consensus, the Senate President will preside over a combined meeting of the House of Representatives and the Senate. Once agreement has been reached, the document is delivered to the National Assembly Clerk who will compile all revisions and create a clean copy before sending it to the President for approval.

Before the President signs a bill, it is not considered to be law. The Bill is created in its entirety by the Clerk of the National Assembly, who then certifies it and sends it on for the President's signature. The President has thirty (30) days to sign a Bill received from the National Assembly. If he or she objects to the Bill or part of its provisions, he/she can seek its revision or exercise his/her veto power by refusing to sign the Bill. Within 30 days, the National Assembly must be informed of the denial and the reason(s) for it. The President must specify the areas that need to be changed. The Bill may be withdrawn so that the President's suggested revisions can be considered, if the National Assembly concurs with the President. For instance, on June 3, 2011, the President signed the TPA into law, indicating his approval of a Bill (Ismaila 2014).

If the president did not sign the Bill 30 days after receiving it, the National Assembly could override the president's veto. In such a situation, the Bill is

recalled by the two chambers, reexamined, and, if approved by a two-thirds majority, becomes law without the President's signature. This system of checks and balances supports democracy and stops a governmental body from acting arbitrarily. With regard to the Niger Delta Development Commission Bill, this is what happened: after passing both Houses, the President withheld his assent, and the Houses later recalled the Bill and approved it again with the necessary two-thirds majority to make it law.

The NACTEST and Other Germane Associated Acts

The main document used by the Nigerian government to combat terrorism is called NACTEST. It is a comprehensive strategy that aims to tackle its underlying causes and provide the best defense against terrorist attacks (Barkindo and Bryans 2016). NACTEST "offers a comprehensive and integrative approach to counter-terrorism," notes Dasuki (2018: 9). Even though it combines hard and soft methods, it places a strong emphasis on a non-violent approach (soft power). It tries to pinpoint the underlying causes of terrorism and develop strategies to counteract radicalization and deradicalize extremists (Ackerman 2014). The TPA (2011, 2013) and MLPA (2011, 2012), which constitute the legal foundation for Nigeria's counterterrorism measures, coexist with NACTEST. The TPA discusses how to stop terrorism and stop funding for terrorist groups, how to reduce the influence of global terrorist groups like Boko Haram, and how to work together internationally to

repatriate suspected terrorists (Chizea & Iyare 2006; Umar 2013). The MLPA provides for the prosecution of terrorists and tries to stop local and foreign financing of terrorism (Mohammed 2021). These laws are carried out by government organizations such as the ONSA, Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), EFCC, Nigerian Customs Service (NCS), Nigerian Fraud Intelligence Unit (NFIU), Prisons Service, and the Inspector General of Police, and are interpreted by the Federal High Courts (Igbokwe 2015; Paden 2019).

The TPA 2013 grants the ONSA the ability to coordinate the law enforcement and security authorities for implementation (Paden 2019). The NACTEST outlines the organizations involved in counterterrorism, their functions, and how they are centrally managed (more organizations are listed than are required by the TPA, 2013). (NACTEST 2014). They include the National Intelligence Agency (NIA), the Federal Ministry of Environment, the Federal Airports Authority of Nigeria, and civil society organizations (CSOs) (NACTEST 2014). The Office of the Attorney-General of the Federation ensures that all counterterrorism initiatives adhere to international best practice, while the ONSA oversees the implementation of all counterterrorism activities (Pate 2015: 26).

NACTEST, Other Germane Associated Acts and Counter-Terrorism

The pentagonal NACTEST structure has five goals: "forestall," "secure," "identify," "prepare," and "implement" (NACTEST 2014). This section

evaluates Nigeria's counterterrorism strategies by taking each of these goals into account.

NACTEST's initial goal is to "forestall" terrorism in Nigeria by involving the public in ongoing public education, sensitization, and deradicalization activities (NACTEST 2014: 16). This will be accomplished through encouraging good governance, prison deradicalization, supporting SMMEs for job creation, media campaigns, and education, monitoring the actions of religious organizations, and providing training in all facets of the Criminal Justice System (CJS) (NACTEST 2014).

Insurgent groups are evolving as a result of poor governance (Udounwa 2013). Government counterterrorism initiatives must be based on principles of sound governance. The supply of the political, social, and economic public goods and services that every citizen has a right to expect from their state and that a state has a responsibility to offer to its population is what the Mo Ibrahim Foundation defines as good governance (Buchanan-Clarke & Lekalake 2016: 36). When there is bad governance, there is a strong likelihood that terrorism will flourish and that government counterterrorism tactics will suffer as a result.

In order to defend their rights, citizens whose political, social, and economic aspirations are crushed by the government may use force. In 2019, Nigeria's Good Governance Index score was 46.5%, placing it in 36th place overall in Africa, below the **Knowledgeable Research (KR) 2026, vol,5, Issue,02**

continental average of 50% (Adele 2021). Safety and the rule of law, participation and human rights, sustainable economic possibilities, and human development are all components of good governance (Adele 2021). Sound infrastructure, employment development, a functioning criminal justice system, and robust governmental institutions are the tools that make good governance feasible.

One of the causes of the rise of Boko Haram and the recruitment of members was poverty (Onapajo et al. 2012). Nigerians make up the bulk of the world's impoverished, with a small fraction being wealthy (African Statistical Year Book 2014). High unemployment rates contribute to high levels of poverty, which is a sign of government incompetence. The majority of Nigeria's population is young (UNDP 2015b), and young people between the ages of 15 and 35 make up around 67% of the unemployed population (Adele 2021). The unemployment rate for young people (ages 15 to 24) rose from 29,9% in 2010 to 37,7% in 2011. In 2015, it decreased to 10.8% for young people aged 25 to 34 and to 17.8% for those between the ages of 15 and 24 (UNDP 2015b). Nigeria's overall unemployment rate in 2013 was 23.9%, but there are variations by location. While it was projected that Lagos had an unemployment rate of 8%, the North East had a rate of 33% (Adele 2021). 72% of people in the North live in poverty, which is shockingly high compared to 27% of people in the South (21st Century Wilberforce Initiative 2016).

Between 2006 and 2015, employment growth in

Nigeria increased by 6.9%. (Buchanan-Clarke & Lekalake 2016). The annual population growth rate is 2.7%, nevertheless (UNDP 2015a). The Federal Ministry of Youth and Sports launched the Nigerian Youth Entrepreneurship Development Program, which sought to generate 3000 employment annually, in partnership with the UNDP. The government added employment in the third quarter of 2015, 90.2% of which were in the unorganized sector, 8.8% in the organized sector, and 1% in government (UNDP 2015b). This emphasizes the importance of the unorganized sector, which, if properly utilized, might aid in reducing youth vulnerability to terrorism and other violent extremism and bloodshed, especially in northern Nigeria.

The government also took steps to encourage the creation and maintenance of SMMEs (Ilegbinosa and Jumbo 2015). Although it accounts for 90% of all enterprises in Nigeria, this sector barely contributes 1% to GDP (Gbandi and Amissah 2014). It covers operations including food services, transportation and storage, sewage and waste management, agriculture, fishing, and forestry, leather tanning, automotive spare parts, and tie-dyeing, among others. It also includes businesses that fix cars and motorcycles (Akinbi 2015; Dietrich 2015). The main issues facing the nation's SMMEs include a lack of access to financing, high import tariffs, exorbitant rents, multiple taxes, an unskilled workforce, customers' preference for imported over local goods, inadequate infrastructure, low levels of education and experience, and low levels of

education and experience (Ilegbinosa and Jumbo 2015; Awofala & Sopekan 2020). Additionally, according to SMEDAN/NBS (2013), more than 70% of business owners do not have patent rights, which leads to unauthorized replication of their products.

Infrastructure and finance facilities are provided for SMMEs, and a regulatory framework is established (Akinbi 2015). The vast majority of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMMEs) (96.4%) rely on personal savings to finance their operations, with loans from the informal sector accounting for just 3% of their capital and formal financial institutions for just 0.21%. (Gbandi and Amissah 2014). Additionally, some people rely on their families, co-ops, and grants (SMEDAN/NBS 2013). Government monies are distributed by the CBN, commercial banks, and microfinance institutions, who also provide loans. The government launched a N220 billion Micro Small and Medium Enterprises Development Fund through the CBN (CBN 2015). Grants are provided to beneficiaries by state governments and microfinance institutions (CBN 2015). A total of N48.59 billion has been disbursed as of the end of June 2015, with an interest rate of 2–3% (CBN 2015). 600 young people and women have received training from the UNDP in collaboration with the Gombe State government (in the North) in trades like carpentry, welding, weaving, knitting, and tailoring; the majority of these trainees have founded SMMEs (UNDP 2015b).

Poverty reduction is a goal of the SMME Refinancing and Restructuring Fund (RRF) (CBN 2014). As of 2014, it had distributed a total of N339.73 billion and produced 16,845 direct employment and over 1.2 million indirect jobs (CBN 2014). Additionally, the CBN and a few state governments have a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in place for the operation of EDCs (CBN 2014). EDCs in Calabar, Makurdi, and Maiduguri trained 6361 budding entrepreneurs and created 6422 jobs as of the end of 2014 (CBN 2014). The government's Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme Fund (ACGSF), which was intended to increase agricultural production, disbursed N84.5 billion, or 931,863 loans (CBN 2014; Gbandi and Amisshah 2014). Due to the predominant agrarian nature of northern Nigeria, the ACGSF is present here. Inputs for farming, seedlings, and processing equipment have been provided to about 3300 internally displaced people (IDPs) as a result of cooperation between the Gombe State administration and the Food and Agricultural Organization (UNDP 2015b). Additionally, the Growth Enhancement Scheme, a federal government program, enables farmers to earn a 50% fertilizer subsidy for up to two bags by utilizing their mobile phones or the Electronic-wallet system (or E-wallet) (UNDP 2015c). More than 1.2 million farmers had already acquired their subsidised fertilizer within 120 days of the initiative's debut (UNDP 2015c). The ultimate goal was to pull 20 million farmers out of poverty by 2015 by providing access to markets, funding, and input support in addition to the creation of 3.5

million employment (UNDP 2015c).

Despite being ranked first in Africa for agricultural output and 25th worldwide, poverty still exists, especially in rural regions (Adele 2021). The country's unemployment and poverty crisis, which is the result of years of neglect and subpar infrastructure development, has been greatly reduced thanks to new initiatives for the development of agriculture and the enhancement of SMMEs. For socioeconomic progress to occur, infrastructure development must continue. Additionally, a strong infrastructure could prevent terrorism. It improves territorial security, lowers expenses for SMMEs, and creates a more favorable climate for them. Infrastructure like irrigation, power, transportation, water, and sanitation need to be improved (Foster and Pushak 2011). This is anticipated to cost \$14.2 billion yearly (Foster and Pushak 2011). This should not be difficult for a wealthy nation like Nigeria, but a lack of leadership and widespread corruption could thwart this effort.

Due to the deplorable state of the train system and the exorbitant expense of air travel, Nigeria relies heavily on road transportation. The movement of agricultural output, raw materials, and completed goods is made easier by the road network. Nigeria's road network is the largest in West Africa, with roughly 200,000 km (Federal Ministry of Works 2013). However, because to the enormous demand, maintaining this network has proven difficult. Because of the strain from Nigeria's enormous and expanding population as well as the ongoing

importation of cars, the country's road network is rapidly losing its quality due to a lack of maintenance (Federal Ministry of Works 2013). Approximately 67% of asphalt roads and 33% of unpaved roads are in reasonable condition (Foster and Pushak 2011). Only 20% of rural residents can access roads year-round (Foster and Pushak 2011). Because to the state of the nation's roadways, numerous lives have been lost in accidents and valuable time is lost. Nigeria's industrial and economic development has suffered as a result. Food shortages and price hikes have been exacerbated by the inability to move food from the hinterland to marketplaces. Industrial growth has also been hampered by the inadequate road system and its deteriorated condition. The majority of rural residents in Northern Nigeria work in agriculture. It is challenging to transport farm inputs and produce when there is a lack of access to suitable roads. The inadequate road system worsens the severity of poverty, especially in northern Nigeria, making young people more susceptible to terrorism and violent extremism (Ajakaiye et al. 2015). To address the problems with the nation's road infrastructure, the government has formed a Road Sector Development Team.

In Nigeria, a shortage of drinkable water also contributes to poverty, since people must spend time and money locating and purchasing water from water vendors rather of investing it (UNESCO 2015). Irrigation also requires water. Access to drinkable water is available in 45% of Nigeria's rural areas and 75% of its urban areas (Foster and

Pushak 2011). Overall, 31% of people have access to excellent sanitation, compared to 58% who have access to drinkable water (Adele 2021). The African Development Bank (AfDB) established water projects in Yobe, Taraba, and certain states to guarantee that 70% of the population had access to clean water (Adele 2021).

The prosperity of a country, the reduction of poverty, and the fight against terrorism all depend heavily on electricity. Nigeria's electrical power supply is at an extremely low level, leading many businesses to turn to alternate energy sources like generators and inverters, which are more expensive than power from the national grid (SMEDAN/NBS 2013). Generators are powered by fuel, which is highly expensive in Nigeria. Additionally, there are persistent gasoline shortages across the nation. This has a negative influence on job creation since it raises operating costs and reduces profit margins.

Nigeria's overall electrification rate is 56.6%, and the rural population's rate is 34.4% (UNDP 2015a). The nation's electrification rate places it 143rd out of 188 nations (UNDP 2015a). Only about 40% of people have access to power, and 89% of rural residents are not wired into the national grid (UNDP 2015b). In addition, the supply is unpredictable, and populations in both urban and rural areas may have power outages that last up to a week. 10,000 MW is the expected total electricity usage, although as of this writing, only 6803 MW were produced (Adele 2021). For instance, only 6.2 hours per day were covered by the electricity supply between April

2013 and September 2015 (Fapohunda 2017). Due to the erratic electricity supply, several businesses, including Dunlop, have moved to nearby nations like Ghana.

The government has made a number of commitments to boost electricity output (Olaoye et al. 2016), but these pledges are rarely followed through on. Election-related issues and political tools now include electricity. The large population of the nation has been given as an explanation for the erratic supply, but this seems to be an excuse to cover up the incompetence of Nigeria's bureaucracy and political elites. Effective electricity generation has also been hampered by sabotage and vandalism of government infrastructure. Due to the destruction of gas pipelines, Nigeria was only producing slightly more than 3000 MW as of May 2019, according to Minister of Power, Works, and Housing Raji Fashola (Adele 2021). Because the nation depends on natural gas to run its power stations in addition to hydro, this has a detrimental impact on the generation of electricity (Buchanan-Clarke & Lekalake 2016; Adele 2021). The nation may produce up to 60,000 MW from renewable energy sources as wind, solar, hydropower, and gas (Olaoye et al. 2016).

Another method of preventing terrorism is education obtained through formal (Western) education and public enlightenment. Nigeria ranks poorly in the majority of global education indexes due to inadequate funding of the education sector (UNDP 2015c). One of the explanations provided **Knowledgeable Research (KR) 2026, vol,5, Issue,02**

for the poor enrollment in formal schools is that many people in the North dislike Western education because of their religious tendencies (NBS 2014). According to Aghedo and Eke (2013), the majority of children that are not in school are Almajiris. In Sokoto and Zamfara States, a 2009 poll found that Qur'anic schools received three times as much patronage as conventional institutions (Aghedo and Eke 2013). According to Fafunwa (1974), the Almajiri system in northern Nigeria has endured for a very long time because people in this area have traditionally favoured Qur'anic instruction to Western education. Due to their lack of parental guidance and education in the Qur'an, the Almajiris are more likely to be enlisted by terrorist groups (Hoechner 2014). These children, who range in age from 7 to 15, attend Qur'anic schools that do not supply food and beg for money on the streets or work odd jobs (Yusha'u et al. 2013; Taiwo 2013; Hoechner 2014). They are enticed to commit acts of terrorism and violence by the promise of cash and material gains.

In response, the northern administration attempted to combine the Qur'anic educational system with Western education. As a result, Almajiri Integrated Schools were established in 27 states as part of the National Almajiri Education Program (Federal Ministry of Education 2015; Yusha'u et al. 2013). In April 2012, this soft power anti-terrorism strategy was introduced (Taiwo 2013). According to estimates, there were roughly 9 million Almajiris enrolled in various Islamic schools outside of the regular education system (Federal Ministry of

Education 2015). The program consists of three parts: creating Model Almajiri Schools; assisting locally run Tsangaya/Islamiyyah and Tahfeez Primary Schools; and incorporating Basic Education into Makarantun Allo, Tsangaya Schools, and Ile-kewu (UBEC 2015: 2). In 27 states and the FCT, 117 model Almajiri schools have been built. Additionally, 138 existing Islamiyyah and Ma'ahad schools in 30 states and the FCT as well as 36 Tsangaya Schools were recognized and given funding to expand their buildings (UBEC 2015: 3). The government's use of soft power to combat terrorism in 2015 was exemplified by this.

Other government initiatives include courses on the establishment of school-based management committees for Almajiri schools for 174 state desk officers and local government education officers, curriculum implementation and training on the use of textbooks for 270 Almajiri Model School proprietors and head teachers, and training provided by the Universal Basic Education Commission (UBEC) for 58 quality control and Almajiri desk officers (UBEC 2015). The recruitment of non-Muslim teachers to teach in the schools and the non-integration of mallams (teachers of Almajiris in Qur'anic schools) into the program are two obstacles facing this reform program (UBEC 2015). The government started a school feeding program in response to the difficulties pupils had with survival.

Even though states and local governments are best suited to carry out this initiative, just a few state governments have agreed to participate (UBEC

2015). Civic education inclusion in the curriculum is one of the goals of the NACTEST's forestall component. Lower (Primary 1-3), middle (Primary 4-6), and upper basic education (Junior Secondary School 1-3) all incorporate civic education (Awofala and Sopekan 2013). Disaster risk reduction, peacebuilding, and conflict resolution are among the subjects (Igbokwe 2015). This will open up a channel for educating people about terrorism, insurgency, and violent crime. The Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) includes Nigeria as a member (Buchanan-Clarke & Lekalake 2016). It coordinated human rights and security programs for Almajiris in Kano in cooperation with the government of Kano State in an effort to lessen their susceptibility to joining the ranks of terrorist organizations (Buchanan-Clarke & Lekalake 2016). The TSCTP has coordinated media campaigns as well as training on peace building and conflict transformation for youth, women, traditional, and religious leaders. The organization also held civic participation, leadership, and tolerance workshops in Kano, Kaduna, and Jos, and it has plans to train teachers and students who would impart their knowledge to others (Buchanan-Clarke & Lekalake 2016).

Government agencies and civil society organizations collaborate to create the NACTEST awareness and communication framework (Pate 2015). The army's civil military relations division, the council of Ulama, and government groups entrusted with raising awareness of the need to combat violent extremism and appropriate security

procedures are among them (Pate 2015). To inform the youth about the need to avoid violent extremism, a shortwave radio program named Dandal Kura was developed for Nigeria's North Eastern region (Buchanan-Clarke & Lekalake 2016). Additionally, Dandal Kura utilize the Internet and social media, including websites, email, Facebook, Twitter, and Short Message Service (Buchanan-Clarke & Lekalake 2016). Since it started in January 2015, according to Buchanan-Clarke & Lekalake (2016), its customers have reaped enormous benefits.

A mechanism is also in place to keep an eye on the operations of religious organizations. One of the forums used to encourage the public to support violent extremism is religious institutions. The governors of the 19 northern states have established a regulatory framework to keep an eye on the operations of both registered and unregistered religious organizations in the region (Adele 2021).

The CJS, which consists of the police, prisons, other security forces, and the courts, is another area of emphasis for the NACTEST's forestall component. In order to foster an alliance to fight crime, police officers in charge of the command structure at the state and local levels cultivate positive connections with traditional leaders, trade union leaders, and other important stakeholders (Otu and Aro 2013). Through neighborhood public relations committees, which meet infrequently to exchange information to prevent and combat crime (including terrorism), the police also collaborate with nearby communities

Knowledgeable Research (KR) 2026, vol,5, Issue,02

(Otu and Aro 2013). Another counterterrorism tactic is the Police Diary program, created by the Nigerian Police and broadcast on the Radio Nigeria Network (Otu and Aro 2013). This live call-in platform encourages communication between the police and the general public, providing an opportunity to inform the public about security issues and solicit comments on police operations (Otu and Aro 2013). So far, topics covered have included counterterrorism training, recognizing suicide bombers, securing public areas, criminal justice administration, and others. On Radio Nigeria's website, you may find and listen to previous programming. The military also takes part in this initiative to enlighten the general public about safety precautions and the evil deeds of Boko Haram. For instance, the military warned residents of targeted towns to be careful after revealing that some Boko Haram members pose as local hunters to evade capture (Buchanan-Clarke & Lekalake 2016).

ONSA is putting into practice a crucial aspect of the NACTEST's prevention section through the use of the CVE. The CVE is a program that "seeks to defeat Boko Haram by executing several government-sponsored activities that address terrorist motivations, grievances, and behaviors on the local, state, and federal levels" (Pate 2015: 32). It is predicated on the idea that using force to stop violent extremism will not work (The Abuja Declaration 2016). Deradicalization and counter-radicalization are goals of the CVE. The program is coordinated at the national, local, and state levels, and Abuja serves as its national headquarters

(Buchanan-Clarke & Lekalake 2016).

Through media advocacy, friendly military-civilian interactions, and counter-radicalization and deradicalization efforts, the government hopes to achieve these goals (NACTEST 2014). Through the CVE program, NACTEST monitors groups that are at risk of radicalization and works to integrate them into society (NACTEST 2014). Religious, cultural, communication, and governance components all play a role in counter-radicalization. Its efforts include developing a directory of Islamic organizations, conducting research on Islam, engaging in interfaith dialogues, and encouraging youth extracurricular activities like athletics (Buchanan-Clarke & Lekalake 2016). This program also includes the growth of SMMEs, the provision of infrastructure, and the awareness-raising efforts outlined earlier in this study.

Deradicalization is a prison-based exercise that seeks to engage violent extremists, prisoners/suspects in intellectual, physical, and entrepreneurial value change to modify their perspectives (The Abuja Declaration 2016; Barkindo and Bryans 2016). Given how readily prisoners may become radicalized, it is also a component of the forestall initiative (UNDP 2015d). Thus, both individuals who were already radicalized before being arrested and those who have a propensity to support extremism are targeted by the CVE program (Barkindo and Bryans 2016). It motivates them to adopt peaceful methods of resolving disputes (Barkindo and Bryans 2016). In

March 2015, the pilot program was carried out at Kuje Medium Security Prison in Abuja (Barkindo and Bryans 2016). The prison's architecture was updated in order to add the contemporary amenities needed to run a deradicalization program. A new living complex featuring a mosque, classrooms, and an outdoor recreation area was built to house violent extremist inmates (Barkindo and Bryans 2016). Prison administrators, Imams, pastors, doctors, psychiatrists, vocational instructors, and teachers oversee the program. NGOs from both domestic and outside have also contributed (Pate 2015).

However, the state of Nigerian prisons is a big worry and could compromise the success of this scheme. It is challenging to accomplish the goals of incarceration, reform, rehabilitation, and reintegration because most jails are overcrowded (Grace 2014). According to Buchanan-Clarke and Lekalake (2016), the country's prisons can hold a maximum of 50,153 convicts, but in 2011, there were approximately 75,261 offenders being kept in 239 facilities (UNDP 2015c). This predicament is caused by facility shortages and judicial delays (Grace 2014). Poor food, insufficient water, poor ventilation, inadequate sleeping quarters, extrajudicial killings, and rape of female inmates by prison staff are just a few of the issues (Buchanan-Clarke & Lekalake 2016). Male and female inmates are not always kept apart in prisons, and in some, juveniles and adults are housed together. Children of mothers who give birth while incarcerated are frequently kept with them in the cells. 69 children were housed with their moms in jail institutions

across the US as of 2013 (Buchanan-Clarke & Lekalake 2016). Contrary to the reformist mission, these inhumane conditions are likely to further harden detainees and terrorists.

Ensure "protection of life and property, public and vital national infrastructure/services, including Nigerian [sic] interests around the world" is the main goal of NACTEST's "secure" mission (NACTEST 2014: 16). This is expected to be achieved by securing vital national infrastructure, bolstering border defenses, and preparing security personnel to deal with terrorist threats (NACTEST 2014). NACTEST was tasked with creating a blueprint for the efficient provision of necessary weapons, ammunition, and supporting infrastructure to the security sector's units fighting Boko Haram. One of the main factors contributing to Boko Haram's rise is the ease with which illegal immigrants and weapons may cross Nigeria's porous borders (Udounwa 2013).

By taking advantage of the porous borders, weak state institutions, the ineffective legal system, and the pervasive poverty, individuals, businesspeople, terrorist groups, and corrupt government officials have been able to manipulate the state, commit crimes, and profit from those crimes with impunity. Boko Haram terrorists are allegedly using animals and posing as women to transport small and light weaponry across the border (Onuoha 2013). Aside from transferring small guns and money laundering, Fulani herdsmen who travel through West Africa with their cattle are also suspected of doing so

Knowledgeable Research (KR) 2026, vol,5, Issue,02

(Adele 2021). These ranchers go on unofficial routes that escape the notice of security personnel. Policing these borders is challenging due to the length of the boundaries and insufficient border police. Border closures might be ineffective because they would encourage increased movement on illicit routes for people, goods, and criminal activity (Solomon 2012).

The length of Nigeria's borders with Cameroon in the east is around 1690 kilometers, those with Niger in the north are about 1497 kilometers, the north-eastern region has a border with Chad of 87 kilometers, and those with Benin Republic of 773 kilometers (Onuoha 2013). Abba Moro, a former interior minister, said there are 1499 illicit entry points and 84 lawful ones (Onuoha 2013). The Nigerian government blocked the North East's borders with its neighbors in reaction to Boko Haram's activities there because they were being used to move significant amounts of weapons (Onuoha 2014). A committee on the proliferation of Small and Light Weapons (SALWs) was also established by the government (Dasuki 2018). A system has been adopted to store the biometric data collected during the capture and issuance of Nigerian passports in order to prevent infiltration by foreigners posing as NPF, Immigration, and Customs officials have received training on border patrols and security (Buchanan-Clarke & Lekalake 2016); measures have been put in place to record the names of passengers prior to the takeoff of commercial flights; and Passengers entering through major airports in Abuja, Kano, and Port

Harcourt in 2015 were subjected to stricter screening (Buchanan-Clarke & Lekalake 2016). A significant problem has always been ensuring adequate security at land and maritime borders (Buchanan-Clarke & Lekalake 2016). The Nigerian Immigration Service (NIS) formed a border patrol corps to increase staff numbers as well as the number of patrol bases and control posts at state borders (Fapohunda 2017). Additionally, there has been international cooperation, particularly in the area of small arms and light weapons (SALWs). The Nigerian office of the UN Development Programme (UNDP), in collaboration with Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), and other stakeholders, is implementing the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)-European Union (EU) small arms program (UNDP 2016). The project seeks to empower national commissions and CSOs while educating border communities (UNDP 2016). It encourages the voluntarily giving up of weapons in exchange for neighborhood development initiatives. A four-day capacity building workshop for 80 security personnel from the military, paramilitary, and DSS as well as community leaders was arranged by the UNDP in conjunction with the initiative for a number of areas that border the Niger Republic (UNDP 2016). The purpose was to inform them of the danger posed by small guns and how to stop their smuggling across international boundaries. However, personnel of security agencies have frequently thwarted these measures by collaborating with criminals in the sale or exchange of weapons and ammunition (Nwanolue and Iwuoha 2010). For

instance, 'inside information' was cited as the cause of the most recent theft of four guns from the NPF armory (Eneanya 2019). It encourages the voluntarily giving up of weapons in exchange for neighborhood development initiatives. A four-day capacity building workshop for 80 security personnel from the military, paramilitary, and DSS as well as community leaders was arranged by the UNDP in conjunction with the initiative for a number of areas that border the Niger Republic (UNDP 2016). The purpose was to inform them of the danger posed by small guns and how to stop their smuggling across international boundaries. However, personnel of security agencies have frequently thwarted these measures by collaborating with criminals in the sale or exchange of weapons and ammunition (Nwanolue and Iwuoha 2010). For instance, 'inside information' was cited as the cause of the most recent theft of four guns from the NPF armory (Eneanya 2019). However, at various points in time, the Nigerian military has discovered weapons and ammunition belonging to Boko Haram (Akinbi 2015; Eneanya 2019).

A joint security task force between the military and other security organizations has been established, and a new division of the Nigerian Army has been established with headquarters in Maiduguri. In 2015, the military's command center was moved to Maiduguri and Yola (Akinbi 2015; Campbell 2014). Operation Restore Order (JOTRO), also known as the Joint Military Task Force, was founded on June 12, 2011, with its headquarters in Maiduguri (Onuoha 2014). Operation Zaman Lafiya and

Operation Lafiya Dole, both Hausa terms that indicate "peace by force," were given to the JOTRO (Buchanan-Clarke & Lekalake 2016). The JOTRO is composed of military, law enforcement, and DSS personnel (Campbell 2014). These organizations joined forces in an effort to combine their knowledge and ensure an open flow of information (Solomon 2012). Patrols, setting up roadblocks, and cordon and search operations are examples of operations (Umar 2013). The TPA of 2013 requires the task force, which is primarily made up of military personnel, to hold and arrest people on matters related to terrorism (Amnesty International 2015). JOTRO has made some progress, killing and detaining some Boko Haram leaders and members (Onuoha 2014). One of its most recent accomplishments was the release of an abducted Chibok girl and her 10-month-old child on November 6, 2016 (Adele 2021). Nevertheless, several people who have been detained have been held without being charged or having access to attorneys (Buchanan-Clarke & Lekalake 2016). Up to 20,000 young men were detained by security between March 2011 and 2015, and 7000 of them passed away in custody (ICC 2015; Adele 2021). These deaths were caused by inadequate jail facilities and extrajudicial killings (ICC 2015; Buchanan-Clarke & Lekalake 2016). On November 7, 2016, the military freed 1271 inmates after learning via investigations that they were not Boko Haram members (Awofala & Sopekan 2020).

Due to its failure to distinguish between Boko Haram fighters and civilians, the JOTRO has been

accused of killing civilians in addition to those who are detained (Mohammed 2021). In order to carry out their terrorist acts, terrorist groups have frequently exploited civilian populations as a shield. Armed action has occasionally resulted in the deaths of civilians when Boko Haram operated in a densely populated region. Making the distinction between Boko Haram fighters who are unarmed and civilians is also difficult. For instance, in response to a Boko Haram attack on a military patrol car in Baga, Borno State, which left some troops injured, the military killed 185 "civilians" and set around 2000 homes on fire (Mohammed 2021). It is unclear if those who died were Boko Haram militants or innocent bystanders. This highlights the problematic interactions between communities and Nigeria's security agencies. Dietrich (2015) pointed out that the military is not trained in protecting civilians. 250 civilians and military personnel were trained by the UNDP and the Japanese government in civil-military cooperation and civilian protection (UNDP 2015b), and some of the trainees have been sent to the North East for peacekeeping operations.

The claims of these human rights violations received a tardy response from the administration. Instead, it aims to hold security personnel accountable for mutiny and what it terms cowardice (Human Rights Watch 2016). The general public's formerly held confidence in the security forces has been undermined by the tense interactions between them and Nigeria's security institutions. In a 2014/2015 poll by Buchanan-Clarke and Lekalake that was published in an Afrobarometer policy

paper, Nigeria was placed bottom in Africa in terms of public confidence in the police (21%) and the armed forces (40%) (Buchanan-Clarke and Lekalake 2016). But on March 8, 2017, the military established a panel of investigation to look into instances of human rights violations during its operations in the North East and stop similar incidents from happening again (Fapohunda 2017).

In summary, JOTRO's operations have been marked by the imposition of curfews, mass arrests, house-to-house searches, demolishing of homes, and unjustified imprisonment and/or questioning of anyone suspected of having ties to Boko Haram (Serrano and Pieri 2014). These are reactive actions as opposed to proactive ones (Serrano and Pieri 2014). Poor intelligence collecting is to blame (Akinola and Tella 2013), mostly because the various counterterrorism agencies are reluctant to exchange pertinent information among themselves (Pate 2015). Furthermore, there is no single repository for information on foreigners and Nigerians. Drones have been purchased by the Nigerian Air Force and sent to the North East for aerial surveillance and airstrikes in order to bolster the intelligence component of Nigeria's security (Buchanan-Clarke & Lekalake 2016; Paden 2019). The Director of Security Services' (DSS) and army's as well as the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps' (NSCDC) intelligence prowess culminated in the finding of ISIS cells in Kano, the "magic book" of Boko Haram, and several arrests (Buchanan-Clarke & Lekalake 2016; Muhammed 2021). A Boko Haram plot to infiltrate the Islamic Movement

of Nigeria and assault Kano, Kaduna, Sokoto, and Maiduguri during the Eid-ul-Fitr celebration was thwarted by the DSS in June 2017. Eight AK-47 rifles, twenty AK-47 filled magazines, 27 hand grenades, and 793 rounds of live ammunition were found in the home of another suspect who had been detained together with two other suspects (Fapohunda 2017). Since the military entered politics, the proliferation and privatization of weapons and ammunition have become a part of Nigeria's history. As a result, the political process has become militarized, which has resulted in electoral violence.

The security services in Nigeria have received training in a variety of security-related fields. According to Musa, who was referenced by Onuoha, this included training in specialized reconnaissance, close-quarters fighting, urban warfare, amphibious operation, information operation and management, tactical communication, civil-military interactions, and forensic investigation (Onuoha 2014: 176). Such instruction tries to persuade security personnel to use global best practices in their counterterrorism operations. The military has also created a canine handling section to improve its capacity for forensic work. About 5000 lower rank security personnel and 137 middle level officers with ranks similar to majors have received training (Azumah 2015). 120 members of the Nigerian Police Force (NPF) were trained by the US government on handling IEDs and preserving evidence from crime scenes following terrorist attacks (Buchanan-Clarke &

Lekalake 2016). Additionally, the EFCC and the NPF have received training in forensics and counterterrorism (Buchanan-Clarke & Lekalake 2016).

A complaints response unit was established in November 2015, and the Nigerian police have a counterterrorism squad that conducts special operations, investigations, and the prevention of terrorist actions (Amnesty International 2016). Due to their civil duties and accessibility, the police are the closest security officers to the general population. They do, however, confront significant obstacles, such as inadequate manpower, inadequate money, and inadequate equipment. These difficulties make it harder for them to stop crime from happening, keep it under control, and fight terrorism's high level of insecurity.

There is a counterterrorism division inside the NSCDC. It came upon the spiritual book' of Boko Haram (Adele 2021). It was thought to have been intended to deceive victims, brainwash Boko Haram's members into being obedient to their leaders, and potentially assist them avoid capture. It was known as Guduma and written in Arabic (Adele 2021). Five persons were detained after the DSS discovered an ISIS training camp in Kano in June 2016 (Muhammed 2021). ISIS's connection to Boko Haram was also verified. The Nigerian Air Force was organized to fight terrorism and has elite commandos and a special force operations squad (Buchanan-Clarke & Lekalake 2016). In partnership with other security agencies, it conducted a

simulated exercise in September and November 2016 on how to avoid or combat terrorist attacks at airports (Buchanan-Clarke & Lekalake 2016; Mohammed 2021).

The military command center was relocated to Maiduguri by President Muhammadu Buhari, who took office on May 29, 2015, with a satellite office in Yola, Adamawa State (Akinbi 2015; Dietrich 2015). This has increased military morale in the North East and made it easier to retake territory that Boko Haram had taken over (Dietrich 2015). Boko Haram had taken control of 17 Local Government Areas in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa as of January 2015, but by July 2015, the MNJTF and Nigerian forces had recaptured the majority of these areas (Human Rights Watch 2016). Additionally, before May 29th, 2015, the states of Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe regained control of more than 25 towns previously held by Boko Haram. They consist of, among others, Abadam, Askira, Baga, Bama, Bara, Buni Yadi, Damboa, Dikwa, Gamboru-Ngala, Goniri, Gujba, Gulag, Gulani, Gwoza, Hong, Kala Balge, Konduga, Kukawa, Marte, Madagali, Michika, and Mubi (Fapohunda 2017). All of the areas had been regained as of the writing of this.

However, there were 1000 fatalities from 60 different terrorist acts between 29th May and the end of August 2015 (Buchanan-Clarke & Lekalake 2016). The optimism that had been present upon the command headquarters' move was dampened by this. As of late 2016, just four of the 100 Boko Haram leaders who were put on the military's

wanted list had been captured (Onapajo 2016; Eneanya 2019). This low arrest rate indicates that the military still has a long way to go before entirely eliminating Boko Haram. However, a Boko Haram member on the wanted list, Idris Babawo, was detained by the police in Ondo State in September 2017 together with sect commander Khalid Al-Barnawi (Eneanya 2019) (Eneanya 2019). Periodic claims by the Nigerian Army that Abubakar Shekau, the factional commander of Boko Haram, had been slain (only to subsequently be confirmed on YouTube) cast doubt on the military's ability to gather intelligence and spread its propaganda. Sambisa Forest, the sect's main stronghold, was taken under its control most recently (Dasuki 2018).

The Nigerian Army's 7th Division, which has roughly 8000 soldiers, was established in an effort to improve security in the North East (Dasuki 2018). However, conflicts between commissioned and non-commissioned officers started in June 2014 (Dasuki 2018). Junior officers accused their superiors of being corrupt and giving sensitive intelligence to Boko Haram, while senior officers accused the latter of being cowardly. As a result, the lower hierarchy erupted in protest. Additionally, the military's top brass has been accused of diverting nearly 90% of funding intended for counterterrorism to benefit themselves (Pate 2015).

Mismanagement of an estimated \$2 billion budgeted for the war against Boko Haram (Buchanan-Clarke & Lekalake 2016; Adele 2021). Some of those accountable have been detained,

while others are in court and some money has been recovered (Buchanan-Clarke & Lekalake 2016). The outdated weapons and equipment utilized by the military cannot compete with Boko Haram's modern arsenal (Pate 2015). Due to this, soldiers have fled from Boko Haram insurgents (Dietrich 2015). For instance, in October 2014, when Boko Haram stormed and seized control of Mubi in Adamawa State, men of the 234th battalion fled their station (Paden 2019). The sophistication of their weapons intimidated the special forces more than just their sheer numbers.

The JOTRO has had some success despite the difficulties it has faced. For instance, between February and July 2017, it killed 404 sect members, detained 810 Boko Haram militants, and saved 19,640 civilians from terrorists (Fapohunda 2017). By elevating 9000 of the soldiers stationed in the North East to various higher positions in 2016, the government also helped to raise morale (Fapohunda 2017). Amman Judee was apprehended, and 212 hostages held by the group were freed, in November 2017 in Borno State's northern Sambisa Forest and Kala Balge Local Government (Fapohunda 2017).

In order to teach the kids how to gather intelligence and make arrests, the military and the government of Borno State have teamed up. They have been particularly active in Borno State and are known as the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) (Buchanan-Clarke & Lekalake 2016). To defend villages against Boko Haram's nocturnal raids, night patrols are set up. The CJTF collects intelligence data and

provides the appropriate agencies with arrested Boko Haram members (Buchanan-Clarke & Lekalake 2016). According to reports, several CJTF personnel once belonged to Boko Haram, which makes it simple to identify sect members (Dietrich 2015). Hunters are also included in CJTF (Dietrich 2015). The group's members have killed and captured Boko Haram fighters while employing rudimentary weaponry including cutlasses, axes, and bows and arrows (Buchanan-Clarke & Lekalake 2016). In 25 local government areas in the North East, the CJTF had a well-coordinated organization, according to a British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) study from May 2015 (Pate 2015).

The CJTF has been accused of rape and other human rights violations (Buchanan-Clarke & Lekalake 2016). Armed organizations, formed around local or regional strongmen, can preserve order and security, but they can also transform into armed rebels, criminal gangs, or protection rackets, and then back into vigilante groups, according to Brinkel and Ait-Hida (2012). Government recognition of the CJTF did not come until much later after it had already been established. After the Youth Vigilante Empowerment Agency Law of 2015 was ratified, the Borno State administration vowed to hire 20,000 CJTF members as firefighters, vehicle inspection inspectors, and members of the state civil service and to pay them a monthly stipend (Pate 2015). 250 personnel of the CJTF have joined the Nigerian Army, while 30 have been integrated into the DSS (Buchanan-Clarke & Lekalake 2016). The goal was to keep them from

Knowledgeable Research (KR) 2026, vol,5, Issue,02

becoming drawn to criminality or perhaps joining Boko Haram as a result of their unemployment. However, between 2014 and June 2017, Boko Haram killed 680 members (Fapohunda 2017).

It is important to "ensure that all terrorist activities are adequately investigated and that terrorists and their sponsors are brought to justice," according to the NACTEST's "identify" objective (NACTEST 2014: 16). The essential elements are thorough investigation and prosecution, interagency information collecting, registration of the Subscriber Identification Module (SIM) card, monitoring of cyberspace, and stopping financial support for terrorist organizations (NACTEST 2014).

The TPA 2013's Section 2, Subsection 5a gives security organizations the authority to look into people's and groups' involvement in terrorist operations (Buchanan-Clarke & Lekalake 2016). Suspects who have been arrested by the military are held without access to their families or attorneys, and many do not appear in court during their trials (Amnesty International 2016). Amnesty International asserts that full investigations are not carried out prior to arrests and that extrajudicial executions occur, particularly while people are being held in custody. Since it guarantees objective investigation and prosecution of criminal cases, a well-positioned CJS is essential to the identifying aspect of NACTEST. Criminal justice professionals ought to use their power in a just and fair manner (Otu and Aro 2013). In May 2015, the

Administration of Criminal Justice Act became a law (Buchanan-Clarke & Lekalake, 2016). It gives instructions to the courts on how to administer the criminal justice system (Buchanan-Clarke & Lekalake 2016) and provides for the payment of restitution to crime victims, allowing them to serve their sentences outside of prison, and electronic recording of court sessions (Amnesty International 2015). Parole, suspended sentences, and community service are all methods of serving a sentence outside of a prison (Buchanan-Clarke & Lekalake 2016). This is expected to help with the issue of jail overpopulation. The Act generally prohibits mistreatment of inmates (Buchanan-Clarke & Lekalake 2016).

In 2015, the Anti-Torture Bill was passed but has not yet become law (Adele 2021). It aims to make the CJS stronger, defines torture and forbids it in all forms (Adele 2021). However, Nigeria's prison conditions do not support a dynamic criminal justice system. According to Amnesty International (2016: 275), "prisons remained overcrowded and court processes were delayed; repeated strikes by court employees—such as court clerks—over pay and the ensuing closing of courts caused delays in trials and the management of pre-trial detention."

Criminal justice administrators need to increase their ability and receive training in order to respond to terrorist offenses effectively (UNODC 2009). This ought to be cross-sectoral and focused on human rights. The National Human Rights Commission provided training to select military

personnel in 2015 on how to include human rights protections into their rules of engagement (Buchanan-Clarke & Lekalake 2016). A human rights training document for the NPF was created by the National Judicial Council and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (UNODC 2014). Additionally, the DSS, police, prosecutors, and judges in Nigeria have received training from the UNODC on their roles in the CJS with reference to counterterrorism (UNODC 2014). The course content includes instruction in national law, which includes the Constitution's core human rights clauses, anti-terrorism measures, and the international legal system (UNODC 2014). It strives to enhance terrorism case investigation, trial, and adjudication (UNODC 2014).

The CJS emphasizes investigation, which necessitates the updating of birth and death data. The National Identity Management Commission (NIMC), in coordination with the National Population Commission, is mandated by the NACTEST to be in charge of keeping records of births and deaths (NACTEST 2014). The National Planning Commission, Federal Ministry of Health, National Population Commission, NPF, and other governmental organizations will hold the data (NACTEST 2014). Only 30% of kids under the age of 5 were registered between 2005 and 2013 prior to the NACTEST's inception (UNDP 2015a). The primary cause is that few kids are born in hospitals. Some Nigerians like giving birth in traditional and religious settings. Additionally, the North has minimal health facilities. For instance, the

population-to-health facility ratio in Borno State is 1:8, 758 while it was 1:1, 089 in Rivers State (UNDP 2015c). Due to the ease with which foreigners can enter Nigeria, commit crimes, and then flee without being apprehended, it is challenging to combat crime.

As of June 2015, documentation pertaining to the cases of 500 Boko Haram militants that were intended to be prosecuted have been received by the office of the Attorney General of the Federation (ICC 2015; Buchanan-Clarke & Lekalake 2016). Three accused Boko Haram members were found guilty of terrorism and ammunition possession, and the Lagos High court sentenced them to 25 years in prison (Buchanan-Clarke & Lekalake 2016). The government began the trial of 1600 alleged Boko Haram members in October 2017 (Fapohunda 2017). Only 25 convictions for suspected terrorists were reported before this date (GIABA 2014a; Fapohunda 2017).

The Inspector General of Police reviewed Force Order 237, which permitted a police officer to shoot any criminal who tried to elude capture or escape from prison regardless of whether they represented a threat, in July 2015 (Amnesty International 2016). This might put a stop to extrajudicial killings. The Nigerian Police provided around N1 billion in compensation to victims of human rights breaches between 2012 and 2015 (Amnesty International 2016). In May 2015, the Cyber Crime Act was passed into law. Without a court warrant, Section 38 allows police enforcement to acquire customer data
Knowledgeable Research (KR) 2026, vol,5, Issue,02

from Internet service providers (Amnesty International 2016). Internet service providers are required to maintain records of their clients' online actions for two years (Amnesty International 2016). The MLPA, 2012, Section 15, forbids any funding of terrorist activities. The same condition is contained in Section 10 of the TPA, 2013 (Eneanya 2019).

The CBN has given financial institution staff members training on how to recognize and report suspicious transactions (GIABA 2014b). This has facilitated the NFIU's ability to report on Critical Transaction Reports (CTRs) and Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs) (GIABA 2014b). In total, banks sent out 3,988,210 CTRs and 2180 STRs in 2014 (NFIU 2015). Additionally, 1,468 STRs and 1,451,046 CTRs were recorded between the first of the year and the last day of September of 2015 (Buchanan-Clarke & Lekalake 2016). Between 1 January and 30 September 2014, there were no money laundering convictions (Buchanan-Clarke & Lekalake 2016), while over the same time period in 2015, there were 30 prosecutions and two convictions (Buchanan-Clarke & Lekalake 2016). If such money laundering contributes to the funding of terrorists is a question that has not been answered.

One of Boko Haram's sources of income is the purchase and sale of commodities to its members (GIABA 2013). Retailers of telecom accessories who support the cult donate a portion of their earnings to the group and also provide unregistered SIM cards to the group (GIABA 2013). Law

enforcement organizations and mobile telecommunications companies won't be able to find you because of this. Sani Mohammed, Kabir Sokoto, and Shuaib Bama were all arrested for their involvement in Boko Haram as a result of the government's requirement that all telecom companies record all clients' SIM cards (Jacob and Akpan 2015). SIM registration has made it easier to enforce TPA 2013 Section 29 Subsection 2a. This clause gives the courts the jurisdiction to let security agencies to ask service providers for information about a customer's actions on the network (Buchanan-Clarke & Lekalake 2016).

Some foreign NGOs and charitable groups that are not based in Nigeria open accounts there and use the money to fund terrorism while claiming to be helping Islamic clerics (GIABA 2013). However, Boko Haram actually reaps rewards (GIABA 2013). This assertion is supported by the fact that most non-profit charitable organizations are institutions of religion (Maharaj et al. 2008). The sect's treasurer stated that members give to the terrorist cause on a voluntary and mandatory basis, taking into consideration their ability to pay (GIABA 2013). The elderly and Almajiris are also used by Boko Haram to masquerade as beggars in order to raise money (GIABA 2013). It is involved in arms trafficking itself, and a portion of the sect's funding comes from the sale of illicit weapons. It has been established that women are occasionally used, possibly because they are less likely to be subjected to security checks, even when the identities of individuals participating are unknown.

The TPA 2011 and 2013's Sections 12 give the National Security Advisor and Inspector General of Police the authority to seize money associated with financing terrorism (Buchanan-Clarke & Lekalake 2016; Adele 2021). Some terrorists' and their sponsors' assets have been blocked and seized (Awofala & Sopekan 2020). The Nigerian government froze and seized terrorist assets as specified by U.S. Executive Orders and by United Nations Security Council Resolutions, according to the 2015 United States Country Reports on Terrorism; nonetheless, delays occasionally occurred. In order to prevent abuse and financing of terrorism, the Nigerian government neglected to oversee nonprofit groups (Awofala & Sopekan 2020).

In 2015, the Nigerian National Assembly debated two bills to stop the funding of terrorism and money laundering (Awofala & Sopekan 2020). The Proceeds of Crime (POC) Bill has not yet been promulgated, whereas the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Centre (NFIC) Bill has been signed into law (Adele 2021). The NFIU wants to make sure that the necessary parties help fight money laundering for terrorism funding (NFIU 2015). A component of the NACTEST's "identify" objective is also the deportation of illegal immigrants. Illegal immigrants from Niger, Chad, and Cameroon have been deported more easily thanks to the TPA 2011 and 2013 (Akinola and Tella 2013).

"Preparing the populace so that the consequences of

terrorist attacks could be avoided" is the main goal of the NACTEST's "prepare" component (NACTEST 2014: 16). This is expected to be accomplished by strengthening authorities' capacity to respond to terrorist activities, identifying the dangers that Nigeria may face as a result of terrorism, and taking into account its repercussions (NACTEST 2014). The NACTEST stressed the requirement for the ONSA to set up a 24-hour national call center to receive anonymous calls regarding terrorism (NACTEST 2014). The call center's specifics have not yet been made public. Additionally, it demanded that NEMA lead coordinated training and interagency cooperation among stakeholders as well as the establishment of Disaster Response Units in some government institutions (NACTEST 2014).

NEMA is the coordinating organization for the provision of care to terrorist attack victims and has emergency toll-free hotlines (Pate 2015). On the official NPF website, 70 emergency numbers, each with 11 digits, can be used to contact 60 policemen. The main issue is that the numbers are excessively long and don't follow best practice, which calls for having short, consistent digits that are simple to remember.

IDP camps have been built thanks to NEMA (Campbell 2014). About 2, 155,618 people were displaced in Nigeria as of April 2016, with 1.8 million of them being a result of terrorist activity. Additionally, as of May 2016, there were 186,473 projected Nigerian refugees in nearby nations

(Awofala & Sopekan 2020). While the IDP camps are located in Adamawa, Borno, and Gombe, the impacted states are the six North Eastern states (Sidi 2015). NEMA provides humanitarian assistance in the form of food, medical care, sanitary products, and educational services in collaboration with pertinent NGOs (Pate 2015).

However, there have been reports of hunger in IDP camps (Awofala & Sopekan 2020), and food and other supplies intended for the displaced have instead been used by wealthy elites. This assertion is supported by the suspension of two traditional chiefs in Yobe State for stealing food intended for IDPs (Adele 2021). In addition, some government officials have been charged with re-bagging and diverting rice that was provided to IDP camps, and some NGOs have been charged with obtaining monies from foreign donors without using them for the benefit of IDPs (Awofala & Sopekan 2020). In IDP camps, there have also been reports of rape cases (Fapohunda 2017). It has been advantageous to have security agencies in these camps. Three planned suicide bombs in an IDP camp in Monguno, Borno State, were thwarted by the Nigerian military in 2016 (Awofala & Sopekan 2020).

Closed-circuit television (CCTV) systems are being installed in strategic locations in an effort to reduce terrorist activity. These are connected to a central database and coordination hub with staff who have undergone training (NACTEST 2014). To protect Abuja and Lagos, the federal government has

started a CCTV initiative called as the National Public Security Communication System (Awofala & Sopekan 2020). However, despite the project's 2010 launch, seven terrorist incidents took place in Abuja between that year and 2014 in the vicinity of the CCTVs (Awofala & Sopekan 2020). This project's execution has been adversely impacted by the country's pervasive corruption (Awofala & Sopekan 2020) and underdeveloped infrastructure. The cameras are solar-powered because the electricity supply in Nigeria is inconsistent (Awofala & Sopekan 2020). Only the areas with government buildings are covered by those in Abuja. They are located in the three arms zone, which is also the location of the National Assembly, the Supreme Court, the presidential villa, and other public structures as well as the commercial sector (Awofala & Sopekan 2020). Only 40 of the 1000 cameras put in Abuja, which was the project's starting point, are in good shape and are connected to the Internet, six years after the project's inception (Awofala & Sopekan 2020).

The Presidential Initiative on the North East (PINE) provides financial assistance to victims whose families have been slaughtered by Boko Haram in collaboration with the Victims Support Fund (VSF) (Pate 2015). "To coordinate the different stakeholders, including the federal, state, foreign development partners, civil society organizations, and private contributors," is the function of PINE (Fapohunda 2017: 33). It has allocated \$2.3 billion to enhance rice and sugar cane production, hence promoting economic growth in the North, and

\$187.5 million to repair schools devastated by Boko Haram (Pate 2015). However, since many farmers have fled and arable land has been converted into a battleground, the success of the agricultural program in the North East depends on ending Boko Haram terrorism and establishing peace in the region.

The federal government launched the Safe Schools Initiative (SSI) in partnership with foreign partners to secure schools in the North East (Pate 2015). Since October 2016, the SSI has been covered by the PINE and is supported by the Department for International Development (DFID), USAID, and NPOs (Awofala & Sopekan 2020). The Nigerian government created the VSF in 2014 (Dietrich 2015). It monitors victims' conditions in collaboration with local groups, state governments, and relief organizations like NEMA and the International Committee for the Red Cross, and collaborates with groups like the Christian Association of Nigeria and the Islamic Council to advance religious tolerance (Dietrich, 2015). But in 2018, the PINE became implicated in a corruption controversy involving more than N200 million and the former Secretary to the Government of the Federation (SGF) (Awofala & Sopekan 2020). Although the SGF was placed on leave and then fired, charges seem improbable.

In Kano, Nigeria, a Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) clinic was established in 2014 for those who have been psychologically traumatized by terrorist acts (Pate 2015). According to Pate (2015),

the government intended to open such clinics in each geopolitical region. However, this has not happened.

Another positive development was the training the Nigerian Air Force received to deal with terrorist assaults at the country's airports (Adele 2021). The fact that Boko Haram has failed to cause mayhem at any airports in Nigeria is no coincidence. However, some 500 of its militants launched an attack on the Air Force facility in the northeast of the country close to Maiduguri, destroying five aircraft carriers and injuring two soldiers. During this confrontation, soldiers shot and killed roughly 22 members of the group.

In Suleja and Yola, bomb factories were also discovered by security personnel, avoiding explosive explosions (Akinola and Tella 2013). Also encouraging were the NSCDC's finding of Boko Haram's holy book and the DSS's uncovering of an ISIS cell in Kano (Muhammed 2021; Adele 2021). However, Boko Haram has carried out a number of IED-bomb strikes. Between 2009 and 2013, these devices were responsible for nearly one-fourth of all fatalities from terrorist incidents (Ismaila 2014). The government responded by ordering the Federal Ministry of Agriculture, the NPF, the Federal Ministry of Solid Minerals, and other pertinent organizations to control the flow of materials and resources used to create IEDs and standardize the operations of explosives-using quarries (NACTEST 2014). Fearing that it could be used to make IEDs, the Nigerian army cut off the

flow of fertilizer to the North East in June 2016 (Awofala & Sopekan 2020). Farmers in the North who depend on fertilizers to increase agricultural production did not benefit from this. This was one of the contributing factors to the food insecurity that existed both locally and nationally. Despite these initiatives, IEDs are still often used in suicide bombings (Agbakwuru 2016).

Developing a framework to "effectively mobilize and sustain a coordinated cross-governmental population-centered endeavor" is the "implement" objective of NACTEST (NACTEST 2014: 16). To execute NACTEST, the office of the National Coordinator on Counterterrorism coordinates the efforts of various authorities and works with other countries (NACTEST 2014). These organizations have responsibilities for raising awareness, conducting investigations, making arrests, conducting trials, and conducting military actions. The CBN, EFCC, NFIU, National Insurance Commission, and other leading organizations collaborate with other national and international organizations to stop the funding of terrorism and narcotics trafficking (Mohammed 2021). With the assistance of CSOs and other relevant organizations, the Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria, National Orientation Agency, and National Broadcasting Commission all work to raise awareness (NACTEST 2014).

Defense Headquarters coordinates the actions of various security organizations in the war against terrorists. The DSS and NIA are in charge of

gathering information for the government's security in both domestic and foreign contexts (Umar 2013). The ONSA, NIA, DSS, Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), police, military, and other law enforcement agencies work together to share information and conduct investigations to find organizations that support terrorism (NACTEST 2014). However, the lack of agency confidence has made the sharing of intelligence (knowledge) less effective (Pate 2015). To strengthen counterterrorism activities and combat money laundering, the NFIU also shares domestic information with the EFCC, DSS, NPF, NCS, NIA, NSCDC, and other organizations (NFIU 2014).

Additionally, the NACTEST emphasizes collaboration with other nations and multinational organizations (NACTEST 2014). Regarding the implementation of NACTEST, the Foreign Affairs Ministry coordinates working relationships with the NIA and DIA on international issues (NACTEST 2014). The TPAs of 2011 and 2013 gave the Nigerian government the ability to work with foreign nations on the extradition of terrorists between nations (Awofala & Sopekan 2020). The Sudanese government turned over Sadiq Ogwuche, the main suspect in the April 2014 Nyanya Abuja bombing who had fled to that country, to the Nigerian police (Awofala & Sopekan 2020). This served as evidence of global cooperation. The Nigerian government also requested aid from nations with the necessary technical know-how, experience, resources, and troops to combat terrorism (Udounwa 2013). With regard to training,

funding, and military involvement, Nigeria has worked with other governments and allies to implement the NACTEST.

The MNJTF was established in 1998 to combat cross-border banditry and is made up of troops from Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, and Chad (Amnesty International 2015). In order to counter the Boko Haram threat, its scope was expanded in 2012, and Benin Republic joined after the April 2014 kidnapping of the Chibok girls (Amnesty International 2015). This structure includes troops from Nigeria, Chad, Niger, and the Benin Republic. Its headquarters are in N'Djamena, Chad, and it is backed by the African Union (AU) and the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) (Buchanan-Clarke and Lekalake 2016). As a result of this multilateral cooperation, Boko Haram attacks increased in the Chad, Niger, and Cameroon (Buchanan-Clarke and Lekalake 2016), which was intended to discourage the nations from cooperating with Nigeria in counterterrorism. The MNJTF, initially consisting of 750 personnel, was authorized by the African Union for deployment (Tejpar and Albuquerque 2015). It now has 10,000 soldiers (Amnesty International 2015).

The MNJTF's specific mission was to safeguard people within Boko Haram's operational area (Dietrich 2015). When necessary, soldiers patrol specific regions and help local troops retake lost ground (Dietrich 2015). Operation Gama Aiki, an airstrike in the North East to offer aircraft assistance for the MNJTF to shell targeted Boko Haram

strongholds within the Lake Chad Basin, was launched by the Nigerian Air Force in June 2016 (Buchanan-Clarke and Lekalake 2016; Mohammed 2021). All of the terrorists were killed after the Air Force struck a sizable gathering of them in Urga, Borno State, in October 2017 (Fapohunda 2017). However, questions have been raised over the soldiers from the MNJTF and Nigeria cooperating (Dietrich 2015). For instance, it was alleged that occasionally when the MNJTF recaptures land captured by Boko Haram, Nigerian troops failed to secure the area to allow civilians who had fled to return (Dietrich 2015). Since then, the situation has altered, and the majority of individuals who fled have returned.

Agreements were reached between the US and Nigeria's binational commission in the areas of good governance and transparency, energy reform, and investments in agricultural and food security (Onuoha and Ugwueze 2014). In order to aid in the search for the missing Chibok girls, the US sent 80 personnel to Chad (Ackerman 2014). In addition, the US supported intelligence gathering and the establishment of communication infrastructure to deter future kidnappings (Jackson 2014). For security professionals, the US government provided financing and training (Onuoha and Ugwueze 2014). Between April and August 2014, the US taught 650 Nigerian military soldiers in fighting techniques (Amnesty International 2015).

In order to help Nigeria in its war against terrorism, the United States Director of Defense (USDOD) **Knowledgeable Research (KR) 2026, vol,5, Issue,02**

provided \$8.4 million in military support (Onuoha and Ugwueze 2014). Additionally, USDOD agreed to sell 12 Super Tucano A-29 planes and armaments worth \$593 million to Nigeria (Fapohunda 2017). This sale was pending Congress's permission as of the time of writing. Due to Boko Haram's ties to Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb, the US government designated its three commanders, Abubakar Shekau, Abubakar Kamar, and Khalid Al-Barmawi, as foreign terrorists (Adele 2021), and set a \$7 million reward on Shekau's head (Onuoha and Ugwueze 2014). To replace the void left by the insurgency in Borno state's educational system, USAID trained 7189 teachers there (Fapohunda 2017).

Additionally promising security and technical assistance to combat the Boko Haram threat were Germany, Italy, and Israel (Adele 2021). The Nigerian armed forces have been offered counterterrorism training from the UK and France (Pate 2015). The Nigerian Air Force was given permission to fly over Cameroon in order to hunt Boko Haram members looking for a safe refuge there (Pate 2015). Between 2013 and 2014, Nigeria received weapons from Canada, China, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Israel, Norway, Russia, South Africa, Ukraine, and the US (Amnesty International 2015). China contributed some drones, while Russia gave the Islamic group access to five war helicopters (Amnesty International 2015).

The UK offered guidance on legal frameworks, crisis management, and bomb site management in addition to training for the courts and anti-terrorism

finance (Amnesty International 2015). Russia trained personnel from the Nigerian Army, Police, and DSS in September 2014. (Amnesty International 2015). In addition, Japan donated \$3 million to Nigeria's government to help it deal with the fallout from terrorist strikes in the North East (Paden 2019). The peace process that led to the release of 21 of the Chibok girls on October 13th, 2016, involved the Swiss government heavily (Paden 2019).

Local and international NGOs/CSOs have supported the NACTEST in a variety of ways, including by generating reports, enlightening the public, fostering the rule of law, mediating discussions, and supplying relief (NACTEST 2014). The National and State Emergency Management Agencies (NEMA/SEMA) in particular are spearheading a government-led response, which is supported by 62 humanitarian groups (sic) currently functioning in the four target states of North-East Nigeria. This includes 11 United Nations offices, agencies, funds, and programs, 27 international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), 19 national NGOs, three Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement organizations, and one intergovernmental organization (Humanitarian Response Plan 2015: 10).

When a national reaction is necessary to urgent problems and in terms of quick recovery from disasters, the Humanitarian Response Plan has always been a cornerstone of assistance (Humanitarian Response Plan 2015). The Bill and

Melinda Gates Foundation gave \$1 million to the Borno State government to help it deal with the fallout from Boko Haram atrocities (Buchanan-Clarke and Lekalake 2016). The state used this donation to supply food and let farmers start up again. It was predicted that this action would help around 40,000 people (Buchanan-Clarke and Lekalake 2016). The International Committee for the Red Cross played a crucial role in the release of 21 of the more than 200 girls¹² who were abducted on October 13, 2016, and the Nigerian government agreed that Boko Haram might choose any INGOs to coordinate the release of the Chibok girls (Adetayo 2016). (Buchanan-Clarke and Lekalake 2016). 163 of the girls had either escaped or been saved by the united military forces as of May 2017 (Fapohunda 2017). A CSO has been particularly active in applying pressure to the government and other significant actors to ensure the girls' release using the hashtag "#BringBackOurGirls" (Buchanan-Clarke and Lekalake 2016). Eminent Nigerians and a coalition of CSOs make up this group, which is committed to applying constant pressure to the government and the international community to free the Chibok girls from Boko Haram's control. To oppose the extreme ideas that Boko Haram propagates, the Centre for Democracy and Development trained 200 clerics in counter-radicalization (Buchanan-Clarke and Lekalake 2016). The trainees, who include Imams, Islamic experts, and teachers from Almajiri schools, came from the states of Yobe, Borno, and Adamawa (Buchanan-Clarke and Lekalake 2016). The government of Borno State began a counter-

insurgency awareness campaign in October 2017 in collaboration with the Department of Civil Military Affairs and Religious Enlightenment, which is a division of the Nigerian Army (Fapohunda 2017).

The best tactics to combat Boko Haram are discussion and interreligious contacts (a soft power strategy), given the diversity of Nigeria's cultures and religions. The government and other counterterrorism actors have recently come to the realization that while a military strategy may be able to defeat Boko Haram, it will not deal with the underlying causes of armed insurgency. Christians and Muslims have historically had a delicate and tense relationship that has led to displacement as well as the loss of lives and property (Toki et al. 2015). Religion continues to play a significant role in explaining Boko Haram's actions (Onapajo et al. 2012), and it is crucial that all parties involved are aware of this. The National Interfaith Religious Council (NIREC) has a significant role to play in counterterrorism, which is highlighted in the NACTEST plan of activity. The quasi-government NIREC was founded in 1999 by 25 Muslim and 25 Christian leaders, according to Paden (2019: 8). It was initially established to provide advice to the federal government on problems of religion.

NIREC's role in the NACTEST agenda is to advance interfaith cooperation and interreligious harmony in Nigeria, especially in the wake of terrorist acts (NACTEST 2014). It engages with various religious organizations to foster and uphold peace (UNDP 2015c) and was a very active body

Knowledgeable Research (KR) 2026, vol,5, Issue,02

when it brought together the leaders of the two main religions while co-chaired by the Sultan of Sokoto and former Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) Chair John Onayeikan (a Catholic Cardinal) (Paden 2019). However, it has been inert ever since the Pentecostal fold took over as CAN's chair. Under the new leadership, Christians were split, which had a severe impact on their cooperation with Muslims and NIREC's operations (Paden 2019). Although the current CAN head is a Baptist (Orthodox stream), this has not developed into a powerful NACTEST.

Fighting to Gain Economic Advantage by Utilizing Violence

There are numerous diverse ethnic and religious groups in Nigeria. Although such diversity could have been tapped into for advancement and prosperity, ineffective management has led to unrest, marginalization, and war (Buchanan-Clarke and Lekalake 2016). Different post-independence governments made the decision to keep the federal system of governance, which was designed in opposition to the United States, based on the diversity of the Nigerian state. There are three main religions in addition to the various ethnic groups, languages, and cultures (Christianity, Islam and traditional religion).

Thus, it was thought that through federalism, variety would be united, and later, growth would follow (Adele 2021). It has not, however, ensured that different ethnic and religious groups will live in harmony with one another (Mohammed, 2021).

This is because political elites have politicized ethnicity in their quest for central power. The political elites view diversity as a tool to enlist supporters along ethnic frontlines in support of their personal and political goals. Thus, ethnic politics are expressed through the state.

Additionally, religion has had an impact on the nation's political climate. Religious beliefs were frequently used by political leaders as a pretext for pursuing ethnic or personal goals. Every race or religion has experienced political or economic marginalization at some point. However, generally speaking, the government has not complied with their demands due to its lack of legitimacy and authority, as well as its leaders' racial affiliations and narrow-minded perspectives (Adele 2021). As a result, people started using violence to get what they wanted. The entire social matrix in Nigeria is characterized by inter- and intra-community, inter-ethnic, and intra-ethnic, inter-religious, and intra-religious warfare, according to Buchanan-Clarke & Lekalake (2016: 75). Some of these battles go back as far as Nigeria's history as a whole.

The interests of the people have generally been prioritized by the government. Violence is viewed in a diverse society as a way to attract the attention of the government. For some people, ethnic militia organizations (often with religious goals) have emerged as a source of hope. They include the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People and the Niger Delta Volunteer Force, which represent the interests of the southern oil communities; the

Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) and Independent People of Biafra (IPOB) push for the political independence of the East under the banner of Biafra; the Arewa Consultative Forum, which ostensibly represents the interests of the North; and the Oodua Peoples Congress, are among them. The most recent gang to form is the Niger Delta Avengers (NDAs). It aims to address the economic and environmental problems the oil-producing Niger Delta region is facing. Due to long-term political neglect, the MASSOB and IPOB want to separate the South/East and a portion of the South/South regions from Nigeria. Other armed groups in the nation are quite different from Boko Haram in terms of tactics, personality, and demands. Along with advocating for the North's growth, it has also rebelled against the central authority, attacked random civilians in the North on a regular basis, especially those who held opposing opinions, and condemned any forms of Westernization. Although terrorist organizations frequently exhibit this trait, Boko Haram has steadfastly pursued these goals. Additionally, Boko Haram has been pushing for the implementation of the Sharia judicial system in the North and eventually the entire nation. The commonality between Boko Haram and other armed groups in the nation is that these issues—political, economic, social, and religious—have plagued Northern Nigeria for years (Campbell 2014).

The majority of the government's responses have been conciliatory, financial, and armed. The

economic response takes the form of hasty or flimsy attempts to develop the area and start building up human capability. The government created the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs and Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) in response to the violent agitations in the Niger Delta and awarded militants who repented amnesty. The amnesty includes monetary compensation, on-the-spot employment, and enrollment in government-sponsored training abroad. Both soft and hard force have now been used to counter Boko Haram's violent agitation. This has changed as a result of military action, diplomacy, and most recently the adoption of economic measures to rebuild and grow the North/East region, which has been devastated by the crisis. These places have been gravely neglected, especially in terms of the development of the infrastructure. To address the declining economic fortune of towns and individuals, the government also established the Victim Support Fund, the Presidential Initiative on the North East, and the projected North East Development Commission (NEDC).

Nigeria's use of soft power to combat violent conflict and counterterrorism, particularly against Boko Haram in the North, could serve as a model for other conflict areas. Boko Haram, which is mostly active in the North/East, has exposed government neglect of this region and its endemic poverty by using violence as a tool. Investigating the results of government reactions to demands from other regions is crucial.

Frustration and Deprivation: A Connection
 Knowledgeable Research (KR) 2026, vol,5, Issue,02

As previously mentioned, the North is plagued by extreme poverty and a dissatisfied populace. Due to the federal government's neglect of this region, there is animosity among the people. Aggression resulted from this dissatisfaction. According to the frustration-aggression theory, while frustration is the root cause of aggression, it need not always result in aggression. Instead, it might result in a tool for problem-solving. Additionally, aggression happens when there is no frustration (Grace 2014). But ultimately, anger and aggressiveness are responses to deprivation, whether they occur together or separately. The most prevalent kind of deprivation for a group or segment of society is lack of access to political influence and financial resources. Ted Gurr identified relationships between disappointment and relative deprivation (Grace 2014). Prior to frustration within a person or group, there is relative deprivation. Thus, when relative deprivation theory is taken into account, frustration-aggression theory is better understood. According to Gurr's *Why Men Rebel* (1970) (quoted in Foster & Pushak 2011), relative deprivation is more widespread than absolute deprivation. It develops when people and groups believe their current circumstances are worse than those of others, especially when they live in the same large setting (Azumah 2015). This perception leads to discontent. One of the key factors contributing to violent conflict in Africa is deprivation or exclusion (Igbokwe 2015).

While the parties do receive some financial rewards, they are not as great as those others receive, and

they may use violence to get what they want (Foster & Pushak 2011). The political and economic sectors of marginalization have long been a part of Nigerian society. Minority groups and the three main ethnic groups have all accused one another of attempting to dominate the others. The political class, which continues to exploit ethnicity as a rallying cry to further personal or political objectives, benefits from ruling elites who support their own ethnic groupings. The wealthy support violence and encourage it among their ethnic and religious communities. If their demands are granted, the elites frequently seize the material wealth and other benefits of success. Individual or group interests take precedence over those of society or the state in a situation when institutions are failing and the political system is unbalanced. Therefore, Nigeria's weak status is the primary reason for relative impoverishment.

The Sub-National Units' Current Situation

One of the main causes of the government's inability to provide citizens with basic services is the sub-national entities' inadequacy as a result of their precarious fiscal situation. Each sub-unit has a different fiscal and economic capabilities, in addition to the ethnic disparities among the states. Agriculture dominated regional economies before oil was discovered, and regions controlled the resources in their spheres and reaped the benefits. For instance, the North was rich in tin and bauxite, and the region only benefited from the exploration of these resources (Aghedo & Eke 2013).

Oil formed the backbone of the Nigerian economy after it was discovered in large quantities. The federal government neglected agriculture while controlling oil and the money made from it. Government spending and revenue distribution were correlated with the production and sale of crude oil. The financial capacity of states was further weakened by the creation of 12 new states in 1967 and the military's intrusion into politics (characterized by a centralized command structure). Following the military's lead, succeeding civilian governments only relied on crude oil. The central government and the states became extremely affluent as a result of the boom related to crude oil exploration. States did not emphasize the necessity of financial and personal independence as a result. The governments strained to meet their financial obligations as crude oil revenue started to decline. Despite the fact that they make income on the inside, they lack the resources to meet their demands.

For each component unit to function and provide services effectively, autonomy is necessary. Each level of government has financial needs that outweigh the money they bring in from taxes and other sources. Internally generated revenue (IGR) and federal account allocations are two examples of state income sources. The authority of each level of government is often determined by their constitutionally established jurisdiction and their capacity to fulfill their obligations (Buchanan-Clarke and Lekalake 2016). According to Akinbi (2015), the theory of revenue sharing in a federal

state is that each level of government receives a financial resource allocation that is specifically suited to their needs as determined by the scope of legislative competence, their actual circumstances, and the statutory calculation indices.

Sales of crude oil and gas, as well as money made from other minerals, taxes, and customs duties, are some of the sources of the federal government's allocation. The federal government kept between 48.5% and 55% of the available revenues between 1988 and 1993, while states received between 24% and 35%, and municipal governments received between 10% and 20% (Dasuki 2018). Between 1994 and 1998, a similar situation occurred, with the federal government receiving 48.5%, the states receiving 24%, and local governments receiving 20%. The remaining 7.5% was set aside as special funding (Dasuki 2018). In the fourth Republic, which ran from 1999 to 2007, the states received 31%, the federal government received 41.3%, and local governments received 16% (Dasuki 2018). Federal government received 52.68% between 2007 and 2010, while state governments received 26.72% and local governments earned 20.60%. (Dasuki 2018).

States' disregard for IGR exacerbates their already precarious financial situation. The federating units have become complacent as a result of the oil boom and enormous national wealth. The monies allotted by the government account, on which many people only rely, are insufficient to cover their obligations. The component units' performance falls short of

Knowledgeable Research (KR) 2026, vol,5, Issue,02

expectations for a number of reasons, including the federal government's usurpation of their financial authority and the significant proportion of revenue going to this level of government. There are, in fact, horizontal financial differences between states. States with advanced industries also produce more IGR outside of cash from the government coffers. However, it has been difficult for the majority of states in the Boko Haram region (the North and East) to produce enough IGR. The fact that residents in the oil-producing regions known as the Niger Delta earn an additional 13% has an impact on state contributions from the federal account as well. This does not benefit the entire North. The political class in this area attributes the region's extreme poverty to this limitation on the financial might of North American states.

In comparison to other geo-political regions, the Internally-Generated Revenue (IGR) of the six North Eastern states - Adamawa, N4.986 billion; Bauchi, N4.851 billion; Borno, N2.613 billion; Gombe, N4.048 billion; Taraba, N3.615 billion; and Yobe, N2.728 billion - is on the low side. The states with the highest IGR in each zone are Kano, with N16.091 billion, Ebonyi, N9.010 billion, Rivers, N76.703 billion, Lagos, N250.623 billion, and Plateau, N7.375 billion. The North East produces the least, although several states with high scores, including Plateau and Kano, have experienced Boko Haram-related bloodshed. The 1999 Constitution outlines the duties that each level of government is responsible for. Defense, law enforcement, customs and excise duties, banking, diplomatic and

international responsibilities, railways, aviation, mines, and minerals are only a few of the exclusive rights and duties reserved for the federal government. Education, agriculture, road transportation, health, and commerce are just a few examples of the concurrent functions and/or authorities that the states and the federal government share. Local governments are given residual duties, which include controlling hoarding and outdoor advertising, recording births, deaths, and weddings, maintaining cemeteries, and collecting tenement rates (subject to state government approval). However, State governments have taken up some of these duties.

The amount of power a unit has inside the federation is determined by its earnings. Small budgetary autonomy has been a barrier to more localized sub-national administrations. The federal government is frequently compelled to get involved in capacity development. This clarifies why militant organizations target the federal government even more. The federal government frequently takes on responsibilities that belong to states and local governments. A byproduct of military regimes that incorporated the centralization of power into the federal structure as a reflection of their military ethos is unbalanced federalism. Despite their claims to have an operating federal government, the military command system was used to concentrate control, as is customary in the army.

The Relentless Search for Equitable Resource Distribution

The majority of federal systems struggle to address fresh needs or interests in their respective regions (Mohammed 2021). The constitution of Nigeria requires the government to enact legislation to ensure effective national governance. The provision of the political, social, and economic public goods and services—which every citizen has a right to expect from their state and that a state has a responsibility to provide for its citizens—is a necessary component of successful administration (Buchanan-Clarke and Lekalake 2016). The essence of government, in the eyes of the governed, is good governance. Therefore, it is required of the Nigerian government to respond to the socio-political and economic requirements of its people. It has, however, fallen short of this anticipation. Nigerian federalism has been questioned due to the state's diversity and the racial affiliations of its ruling class, and the state has also been accused of favoring some communities over others. To encourage national integration and relative equality, the central government has implemented various policies to advance equal access to public goods. These include, among other things, enacting the Federal Character Principle, establishing state and municipal governments, ensuring that all states have an equal number of representatives in the National Assembly, and continuing to examine the revenue-sharing formula (Paden 2019). Although many still turn to armed resistance, some groups continue to feel as though their interests have been grossly disregarded.

The use of violent conflict to get the federal

government's attention has been successful in many areas, such as the oil-producing states, which were completely ignored for decades before the community turned to revolt. Despite the fact that some of their demands may seem unjustified and unreasonable, they are motivated by a combination of government inaction and the fact that the vast majority of people do not share in the nation's prosperity. Armed protests are primarily motivated by poverty and angst over subpar service and crumbling infrastructure. It occasionally also results from the supposed hegemony of one group over another, whether real or perceived. It was bluntly labeled as ethnic cleansing of the North during Nigeria's first military revolution, which took place in January 1966 and resulted in the deaths of many members of the ruling elite. Despite numerous attempts to downplay the ethnic stance of the coup plotters, many of the casualties were of northern ancestry, and the North saw it as a planned attack on the northern political class. Therefore, the North's mission to exact revenge on the political class from the East was shown in the July 1966 counter-coup. The violent Nigerian civil war, also known as the Biafra War between 1967 and 1970, was the culmination of this. The political elite of the east began a bloody campaign to separate the Federal Republic of Nigeria into the Republic of Biafra (Barkindo & Bryans 2016).

The fight for a Biafran state continues more than fifty years after the conclusion of this civil war. One of the defenses offered in favor of this demand was that the Igbo tribe, which rules the East, has never

held the office of executive president and does not believe that they will anytime soon. The cause, which is led by IPOB and MASSOB, has recently increased its efforts to become a republic; nevertheless, it has not attracted as much support in the East as the 1967 attempt to create a Biafra state. There has also been a change in strategy, as these organizations now use demonstrations to call the federal government's attention.

In order to promote peace and security, the government has adopted both a hard and soft strategy. It often responds by deploying security forces to maintain peace and order and by starting local development initiatives. The South East Development Commission (SEDC), which the administration has suggested be established, has just completed its second reading in the Senate as of the time of this writing (Buchanan-Clarke and Lekalake 2016). When fully operational, this organization will address the region's deteriorating infrastructure by building roads, housing, energy, and facilities for health and education (Buchanan-Clarke and Lekalake 2016). The five South Eastern states' 15% federal allocation will be used to create funds. After ten years of operation, the commission may be dissolved (Fapohunda 2017).

Beginning in the early 1990s, the Yoruba tribe of the West began to rebel and engage in armed conflict with the government. A candidate of Yoruba descent, M.K.O. Abiola, was thought to have won the 1993 presidential election, and its annulment prompted unrest and bloodshed in

several sections of the nation (Paden 2019). These were louder in the West, which caused the O'odua People's Congress to develop as a militant organization (OPC). The OPC and the political elites of the Yoruba ethnic group vowed to separate from Nigeria. The controversy sparked interest across the nation as security personnel worked to demolish OPC structures and reestablish security in the affected districts in the West. The political and military elites of the nation understood the importance of electing a Yoruba as the next president. For the 1999 presidential election, two Yoruba-descent candidates (representing the two major parties) were proposed. The People's Democratic Party (PDP) nominated Olusegun Obasanjo, while the Alliance for Democracy selected Olu Falae (AD). May 1999 saw Obasanjo take office as president. Since the 1960s, oil-related violence has enveloped the oil-rich Niger Delta region. Major Isaac Jasper Adaka Boro, who took up guns to draw attention to the devastation of the environment, violations of human rights, and poverty in the oil-producing areas, led the first armed rebellion. Long periods of neglect and deprivation, along with the callous behavior of succeeding administrations and the oil firms, led to demonstrations and conflict that eventually escalated into militancy (Paden 2019). On February 23, 1966, Adaka Boro established the Niger Delta Volunteer Force and proclaimed the Niger Delta Republic. Before falling to the federal forces' greater military power, his group fought them for 12 days.

The Oil Minerals Producing Development Commission (OMPADEC) was established in 1992 to address the infrastructure issues in oil-producing states as a result of continued disregard for the oil region, protests, and violent clashes with the government (Paden 2019). Environmental deterioration, inadequate infrastructure, and resource management, however, continue to be major problems in the Niger Delta region. As a result, there were more armed organizations present in the area, which led to the abduction of employees of oil companies, the damage of oil installations, and the construction of unauthorized refineries. The rebellion persisted and the area remained impoverished even as the government conducted its military operations there, which resulted in the loss of lives and property. OMPADEC was replaced by the Niger Delta Development Commission since it was unable to significantly advance the area (NDDC). However, neither the infrastructure nor the living conditions of oil settlements saw any significant modifications. Armed war persisted, but its tactics altered. Due to the increased frequency of attacks on and kidnappings of their employees, the oil firms found it challenging to conduct business.

The government increased its soft power initiatives as a result of the losses brought on by the destruction of oil facilities, particularly pipelines. A program of amnesty was made available to insurgents in the Niger Delta in 2009. The package includes financial incentives for people who gave up their weapons, education, training, and rehabilitation programs, and pardons (Paden 2019).

In order to deal with concerns connected to this oil-rich region, the government has established the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs. Although these programs have been successful, "repentant" militants have expressed dissatisfaction over the irregular payment of their salary.

North East's Economic Intervention

The case of Boko Haram is different from the armed confrontations with the state discussed in the previous section. Most of the crisis confronted by the government was related to resource misgovernance and marginalization of an ethnic groups. Thus, agitation was seen as liberation movements, while leaders of such were regarded as heroes. Many of them like the environmental activist, late Saro Wiwa, were accorded international respect. The case of Boko Haram is starkly different. Boko Haram's utterances and activities clearly show that their main objective is not to draw attention to the economic plight of their people or to fast-track development in the North/East. Rather, the sect aims to propagate extreme religious beliefs through the display of violence, and destruction of lives and property. These intentions notwithstanding, the violence has led to some development in the region. Although, there are still cases of terrorism, Boko Haram's reign of terror has been diluted by government forces and those of its global partners. The government is now adopting various measures to reconstruct and rehabilitate the people of the North East region. These include the Presidential Initiative on the North East (PINE), the Victims Support

Knowledgeable Research (KR) 2026, vol,5, Issue,02

Fund (VSF), Safe Schools Initiative (SSI) (Pate 2015), and establishment of the North East Development Commission.

Global partners have also come to the table. The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation donated \$1 million to the Borno State government for provision of food and to revive agriculture in the state (Mohammed 2021). The Japanese government donated \$3 million to the Nigerian government to assist victims of terrorist attacks in the North East with trade and farming (Mohammed 2021). The World Bank earmarked \$800 million to rebuild infrastructure destroyed by Boko Haram in the North East (Mohammed 2021) and the UNDP pledged about \$1 million to rebuild houses destroyed by Boko Haram in Ngwom, Mafa Local Government, Borno State (Dasuki 2018). The new houses are superior to those destroyed by Boko Haram. While the beneficiaries are not terrorists but they have been directly affected by terrorism and have benefited from counter-terrorism initiatives.

The United States Agency for International Development trained 7189 teachers in Borno state to fill the gaps created by terrorist activities (Mohammed 2021), while the SSI was introduced by the federal government to promote security in schools in the North East, (Pate 2015). PINE earmarked \$187.5 million to rebuild schools destroyed by Boko Haram (Pate 2015). In collaboration with the Victims Support Fund (VSF), PINE provided economic support to victims whose family members had been killed by Boko Haram

(Pate 2015). In order to boost economic growth in the North, PINE has set aside \$2.3 billion to promote rice and sugar cane production. The VSF was established in 2015 to facilitate economic empowerment for terrorism victims, medical support and educational support for displaced children (Dietrich 2015). It works with communities, religious bodies, state governments, the private sector and relief agencies to determine the condition of victims and the form of assistance required. As reflected on its website, the fund has distributed relief to households in the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Adamawa and Borno States; donated N2 billion to the SSI; has supported women economic empowerment programs in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe States; and provided economic support to households through agro-based interventions.

A Bill establishing the North East Development Commission was passed in October 2016 (Dasuki 2018). The commission is partly funded from 3% of the Value Added Tax accruing to the federal government, with a 15% allocation to the North East states (including Plateau and Kano), and 50% from the ecological fund due to these seven states (Mohammed 2021). The commission is charged with the responsibility of resettling, rehabilitating and reconstruction of roads, houses, and business premises of victims of the insurgency using funds from the federation account and international donors (Paden 2019). These soft approaches to counter-terrorism and development initiatives in Boko Haram zones have given the North/East an

economic advantage over the other regions, especially in the North. The North/East states are not financially buoyant and are the least developed in terms of education and infrastructure (Mohammed 2021). The African Economic Outlook 2021 Report noted that, as at 2015, “70.4% of people live on less than a dollar a day in the North-West, 50.1% in the South-West, 59.2% in the South-East, 59.7% in North-Central, 69.1% in North-East, and 56.1% in South-South”. Book Haram activities has exposed the impoverishment of the zone to both local and international audiences. Thus, government have had to embark on series of developmental initiatives to facilitate infrastructural development and human capacity building. The real concern, however, is not the gradual development of the region, but the propensity for the Nigerian state to only act when armed insurgency rears its head. This opens the gate to armed struggle in other regions.

Conclusion

This paper examined Nigeria’s counter-terrorism strategies in the form of the NACTEST and related Acts. It focused on the roles played by the Nigerian government, CSOs, and international partners in counter-terrorism strategies and implementation. It presented as the anchor legislative framework guiding the implementation of counterterrorism in the country. It contains other elements of anti-terrorism and constitute a pillar upon which government’s action is constructed. The assessment was based on the NACTEST’s key objectives of forestall, secure, identify, prepare and implement.

These objectives seek to prevent and manage the consequences of terrorist attacks and represent hard and soft approaches to counter-terrorism. While Nigeria recorded some success in its counter-terrorism campaign, much remains to be done because terrorism is multi-faceted hydra. Boko Haram remains active in Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin. The challenges that hinder implementation of the counter-terrorism strategies set out in these documents include low levels of inter-agency co-operation and intelligence sharing; corruption and institutional weaknesses. It is thus important to review terrorism and counterterrorism strategies in other countries.

This paper has also shown that the Nigerian government has failed to effectively fulfill its responsibilities to its citizens as it has the tendency to only take action after violence has broken out. Ethnic groups and sectional or ideological groups have thus been emboldened to adopt violence as a means of compelling the government to invest in their communities. Although Boko Haram's intentions go beyond economic considerations, these cannot be entirely ruled out as a motivation for their terrorist endeavors. Indeed, the sect has drawn national and global attention to the plight of the people of northern Nigeria. The paper further described the distorted federal arrangements in Nigeria, and highlights some of the factors that account for it. Given that the sub-national units are closer to the people than the federal government, they should be granted more autonomy and financial capacity to promote tangible development

Knowledgeable Research (KR) 2026, vol,5, Issue,02

within their sphere of authority. State and local governments' inability to respond to the needs of their people explains the lure of criminality and terrorism. Extreme reliance on federal allocations is counter-productive; hence, states should devise ways to increase IGR. Furthermore, democratic mechanisms should be established to enable demands to be expressed without recourse to violence. Above all, violence and armed rebellion should not become the established norm to force the federal government to perform its constitutional duty of service delivery.

References

- Ackerman, D. (2014). The rise of Radical Islamic Terrorism in Africa: State Collapse vs. State Dysfunction. Unpublished Thesis (MA) University of the Witwatersrand.
- Adele, B. (2021). The Boko Haram Crisis and Nigeria's External Relations. *British Journal of Arts and Social Science*, II (11): 126–139.
- African Statistical Year Book (2014). *Economic Statistics in Africa: Status, Challenges and Way Forward*.
- Aghedo, I and Eke, J.S. (2013). From Alms to Arms: The Almajiri Phenomenon and Internal Security in Northern Nigeria. *The Korean Journal of Policy Studies*, 28 (3): 97–123.
- Ajakaiye, O., Jerome, A.T., Nabena, D. and Alaba, O.A. (2015). Understanding the relationship

between growth and employment in Nigeria (No. 2015/124). WIDER Working Paper.

Akinbi, O.J. (2015). Examining the Boko Haram Insurgency in Northern Nigeria and the Quest for a Permanent Resolution of the Crisis. *Global Journal of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences*, 3 (8): 32–45.

Akinola, A.O. and Tella, O. (2013). Boko Haram Terrorism and Nigeria's Security Dilemma: Rethinking the State's Capacity. *International Journal of Innovative Social Sciences and Humanities Research*, 1 (3): 70–78.

Amnesty International (2015). Stars on their Shoulders. Blood on their Hands: War Crimes Committed by the Nigerian Military.

Amnesty International (2016). Amnesty International Report 2015/2016: The State of the World's Human Rights.

Awofala, A.O. and Sopekan, O.S. (2020). Recent Curriculum Reforms in Primary and Secondary Schools in Nigeria in the new Millennium. *Journal of Education and Practice*, 4 (5): 98–107.

Azumah, J. (2015). Boko Haram in Retrospect. *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations*, 26 (1): 33–52.

Barkindo, A. and Bryans, S. (2016). De-Radicalising Prisoners in Nigeria: Developing a

Basic Prison Based Deradicalisation Programme. *Journal for Deradicalisation*, 7: 1–25.

Brinkel, T. and Ait-Hida, S. (2012). Boko Haram and Jihad in Nigeria. *Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies*, 40 (2): 1–21.

Buchanan-Clarke, S. and Lekalake, R. (2016). Extremism in Africa: Public opinion from the Sahel, Lake Chad, and the Horn. *Afrobarometer Policy Paper No. 32*.

Campbell, J. (2014). United States Policy to Counter Nigeria's Boko Haram. Council for Preventive Action. Council Special Report No. 70, November 2014.

CBN (2014). Central Bank of Nigeria. Central Bank of Nigeria Annual Economic Report – 2014.

CBN (2015). Central Bank of Nigeria. Economic Report for the First Half of 2015.

Chizea, B. and Iyare, T. (2006). Nigeria's Raging Ethnic Conflicts: The Role of Small Arms and Private Military Companies (PMCs). *The Constitution*, 6 (1): 71–100.

Dasuki, M. (2018). The Fight against Terrorism and Piracy. Paper Presented by National Security Adviser, Mohammed Sambo Dasuki at the 10th Regional Meeting (West Africa) of the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly from 17th-19th July 2013.

Dietrich, K. (2015). “When We Can’t See the Enemy, Civilians Become the Enemy”: Living Through Nigeria’s Six-Year Insurgency. Center for Civilians in Conflict.

Eneanya, A. (2019). Policy Research, Analysis and Effective Policy Making in Nigeria. Lagos: Concept Publishers.

Fafunwa, A. (1974). History of Education in Nigeria. George Allen and Unwin Ltd: London.

Fapohunda, O. (2017). Protecting Human Rights in Times of Insurgency and Civil Disorder.

Fashagba, J. (2009). Legislative Oversight under the Nigerian Presidential System. *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 15 (4): 439–459.

Federal Ministry of Education (2015). Education for All 2015 National Review: Nigeria EFA Review Report 2000-2014.

Federal Ministry of Works (2013). Compendium Report on Road Infrastructure and Related Development in Nigeria – An Investor’s Manual.

Foster, V. and Pushak, N. (2011). Nigeria’s infrastructure: a Continental Perspective. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series.

Gbandi, E.C. and Amissah, G. (2014). Financing Options for Small and Medium Enterprises **Knowledgeable Research (KR) 2026, vol,5, Issue,02**

(SMMEs) in Nigeria. *European Scientific Journal*, 10 (1): 327–340.

GIABA (2013). FATF Report. Terrorist Financing in West Africa.

GIABA (2014a). 2013 Annual Report. Intergovernmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa.

GIABA (2014b). Sixth Follow Up Report: Mutual Evaluation, Nigeria. Intergovernmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa.

Grace, A. (2014). Assessment of Prison Overcrowding in Nigeria: Implications for Rehabilitation, Reformation and Reintegration of Inmates. *IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences (IOSR-JHSS)*, 19 (3): 21–26.

Hoechner, H. (2014). Traditional Quranic Students (Almajirai) in Nigeria: Fair Game for Unfair Accusation. In: Montclos, M. ed. *Boko Haram: Islamism, Politics, Security and the State in Nigeria*. African Studies Centre: Leiden, 63–84.

Humanitarian Response Plan (2015). Humanitarian Response Plan: January–December 2016.

Human Rights Watch (2016). World Report 2016: Events of 2015.

ICC (2015). Report on Preliminary Examination Activities (2015).

Igbokwe, C.O. (2015). Recent Curriculum Reforms at the Basic Education Level in Nigeria Aimed at Catching Them Young to Create Change. *American Journal of Educational Research*, 3 (1): 31–37.

Ilegbinosa, I.A. and Jumbo, E. (2015). Small and Medium Scale Enterprises and Economic Growth in Nigeria: 1975-2012. *International Journal of Business and Management*, 10 (3): 203–216.

Ismaila, H. (2014). IEDs Incidents in Nigeria, International Assistance, Synergy and the Way Forward. Paper Delivered at the CCWII Meeting of Expert in Geneva.

Jackson, R. (2014). #BringBackOurGirls: Addressing the Growing Threat of Boko Haram.

Testimony of Ambassador Robert P. Jackson, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on African Affairs.

Jacob, J. and Akpan, I. (2015). Silencing Boko Haram: Mobile Phone Blackout and Counterinsurgency in Nigeria's Northeast Region. *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development*, 4 (1): 1–17.

Maharaj, B. Habib, A. Chetty, I. Favis, M. Khan, S. Sithole, P. and Sookrajh, R. (2008). Religion and Development. In Adam, H and Maharaj, B. eds. *Giving and Solidarity: Resource Flows for Poverty*

Alleviation in South Africa. *Human Sciences Research Council*, 79–119.

Mohammed, K. (2021). The Message and Methods of Boko Haram. In: Montclos, M. ed. *Boko Haram: Islamism, Politics, Security and the State in Nigeria*. African Studies Centre: Leiden, 9–32.

NACTEST (2014). *National Counter-Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST)*. Office of the National Security Adviser.

National Bureau of Statistics (2014). *LSMS-Integrated Surveys on Agriculture General Household Survey Panel 2012/2013*.

NFIU (2014). *Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit. NFIU 2013 Progress Report*.

NFIU (2015). *Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit. Activity Report 2014*.

NIS (2013). *Monthly News Magazine, August 2013. Volume 1 No. 1*.

Olaoye, T. Ajilore, T. Akinluwade, K. Omole, F. and Adetunji, A. (2016). Energy Crisis in Nigeria: Need for Renewable Energy Mix. *American Journal of Electrical and Electronic Engineering*, 4(1):1–8

Onapajo, H. (2016). Has Nigeria Defeated Boko Haram? An Appraisal of the Counter-Terrorism Approach under the Buhari Administration. *Strategic Analysis*, 41 (1): 61–73.

Onapajo, H. Uzodike, U.O. and Whetho, A. (2012). Boko Haram Terrorism in Nigeria: The International Dimension. *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 19 (3): 337–357.

Onuoha, F.C. (2013). Porous Borders and Boko Haram's Arms Smuggling Operations in Nigeria. *Al Jazeera Center for Studies*, 8.

Onuoha, F.C. (2014). Boko Haram and the Evolving Salafi Jihadist Threat in Nigeria. In: Montclos, M. ed. *Boko Haram: Islamism, Politics, Security and the State in Nigeria*. African Studies Centre: Leiden, 158–191.

Onuoha, J. and Ugwueze, M.I. (2014). United States Security Strategy and the Management of Boko Haram Crisis in Nigeria. *Global Journal of Arts Humanities and Social Sciences*, 2 (3): 22–43.

Otu, S.E. and Aro, G.C. (2013). Dealing with Professionalism and Acquiring and Managing Legitimacy in a Constitutional Democratic Policing in Nigeria: Where Goes the Procedural Justice Approach. *JJIS*, 13, 149–169.

Paden, J. (2019). *Religion and Conflict in Nigeria*. Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace: Special Report.

Pate, P. (2015). "Boko Haram: An Assessment of Strengths, Vulnerabilities, and Policy Options." Report to the Strategic Multilayer Assessment **Knowledgeable Research (KR) 2026, vol,5, Issue,02**

Office, Department of Defense, and the Office of University Programs, Department of Homeland Security. College Park MD: START, January 2014.

Serrano, R. and Pieri, Z. (2014). *By the Numbers: The Nigerian State's Efforts to Counter Boko Haram*. In: Montclos, M. ed. *Boko Haram: Islamism, Politics, Security and the State in Nigeria*. African Studies Centre: Leiden, 192–212.

Sidi, M. (2015). *The Humanitarian Consequences of the Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria*. Paper Presented at the African Union Regional Consultative Meeting for the West African Region for the Development of the Common African Position on the World Humanitarian Summit, Istanbul Turkey 2016 at Abuja 26–28 August 2015.

SMEDAN/NBS (2013). *SMEDAN and National Bureau of Statistics Collaborative Survey: Selected Findings*.

Solomon, H. (2012). Counter-Terrorism in Nigeria. *The RUSI Journal*, 157 (4): 6–11.

Taiwo, F.J. (2013). Transforming the Almajiri Education for the Benefit of the Nigerian Society. *Journal of Educational and Social Research*, 3 (9): 67–72.

Tejpar, J. and Albuquerque, A. (2015). *Challenges to Peace and Security in Africa: The Role of ECOWAS*. *Studies in African Security*.

Toki, T.O., Gambari, M. A and Hadi, M.I. (2015). Peace Building and Inter-Religious Dialogue in Nigeria. *Journal of Islam in Nigeria*, 1 (1): 104–116.

UBEC (2015). Universal Basic Education Commission, Almajiri Education Programme Unit: Update on Almajiri Education Programme.

Udounwa, S. (2013). Boko Haram: Developing New Strategies to Combat Terrorism in Nigeria. Unpublished Thesis (MSS) United States Army War College.

Umar, A. (2013). Nigeria and the Boko Haram Sect: Adopting a Better Strategy for Resolving the Crisis. Unpublished Thesis (MA) Naval Postgraduate School. Monterey, California.

UNDP (2015a). Human Development Report 2015.

UNDP (2015b). Annual Report 2015. UNDP Nigeria.

UNDP (2015c). National Human Development Report 2015. Human Security and Development in Nigeria.

UNDP (2015d). Regional and Multi-Country Project Document. Preventing and Responding to Violent Extremism in Africa: A Development Approach.

UNDP (2016). Annual Report Progress 2015. ECOWAS/EU Small Arms Project.

UNESCO. (2015). The United Nations World Water Development Report 2015. Water for a Sustainable World.

21st Century Wilberforce Initiative (2016). Nigeria Fractured and Forgotten: Discrimination and Violence along Religious Fault Lines.